



The Saemaul Undong Movement in the Republic of Korea

Sharing Knowledge on
Community-Driven Development



The *Saemaul Undong* Movement in the Republic of Korea

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Community-Driven Development

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Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CDD	community-driven development
cm	centimeters
ha	hectare
km	kilometer
m	meter
SPCC	<i>Saemaul</i> promotional council at the county level
SPCT	<i>Saemaul</i> promotional council at the town level
SU	<i>Saemaul Undong</i>
VDC	village development committee
VGM	village general meeting
W	won

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Executive Summary

S*aemaul Undong* (SU), the New Village Movement (or “SU movement,” as it is often referred to), was a community-driven development (CDD) program pursued during the 1970s in the Republic of Korea. Ultimately, this was the key program in the country’s long-term economic development initiative implemented during the latter half of the 20th century. *Saemaul Undong* was not the first rural community development initiative in the Republic of Korea. Nongovernment rural community movements such as the Christian 4-H (Head, Heart, Hand, and Health) Club predated *Saemaul Undong*, as did the nationalistic *Ch’ondogyo* agricultural cooperative movement that dated back to the days when the country was under colonial rule. As for modern government-sponsored rural community development programs, these were first introduced during the 1950s by the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Similarly, following the National Reconstruction Movement, which was a government-driven campaign promulgated by the military junta in 1961, the Government of the Republic of Korea began implementing its Six-Year Rural Development Plan (1966–1971) in 1965. This medium-term plan included a series of projects that focused on increasing rural household income. Then in 1970, the SU movement was launched by President Park Chung Hee during a famous speech that he delivered at a meeting of provincial government leaders in the southeastern city of Pusan. This speech made reference to what might be called a New Village Remodeling Movement based on the “*Saemaul* spirit,” the three components of which were diligence, self-help, and cooperation.

The major aim of the SU movement was to overcome what at the time appeared to be endemic rural poverty in the Republic of Korea. In the early 1970s, 33,267 *mauls* (traditional villages) participated in the SU movement. In each *maul*, male and female *Saemaul* leaders were democratically elected at a village general meeting.

The outward achievements of the movement included rehabilitation of village infrastructure,

improvement in the overall rural living environment, and a significant increase in household income. Implementation of the SU movement took place in three successive stages that focused on basic infrastructure (Stage I); development (Stage II); and dissemination (Stage III), by which is meant broadening of the populace who embraced the principles that led to the movement’s success in both the medium and long term.

Thanks to upgrading of the agricultural production infrastructure and introduction of high-yielding *Indica* and *Japonica* hybrid rice varieties, by the end of Stage I, rural household incomes had reached parity with those of urban industrial households. During Stage II, village life was improved through modernization of rural dwellings with changes such as replacement of thatched roofs with tin, tile, and slate roof coverings; electrification; and introduction of telecommunications on a mass basis in rural villages. By the end of the 1970s, the Republic of Korea had overcome its chronic shortfall in the domestic supply of food.

Ultimately, the most valuable long-term benefits of the SU movement were not its outward tangible achievements, but rather those that resulted from the sweeping change in the mentality of the people induced by the SU movement itself. In sum, the SU movement built a national confidence infused with a “can-do” spirit that transformed a former national mentality of chronic defeatism into new hope, a long-term shared vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthusiasm sustained by volunteerism at the community level.

The SU movement built social capital through community networking that took place in *Saemaul* halls, in village forums, and at village general meetings (VGMs). During the period 1972–1980, more than 37,000 community halls were built, this total number translating into nearly one community hall per village. So great was the SU movement’s impact on community empowerment that the decision-making

power of the nongovernment VGMs ultimately exceeded that of the semigovernmental village development committees, which in part comprised local government administrative officials.

Perhaps more importantly, the SU movement shifted the cultural focus of rural communities away from Confucian-oriented biases that rewarded paying deference to men and to those viewed as being senior to oneself. Participation by women in the planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of CDD projects was facilitated by election of a female *Saemaul* leader who functioned as a partner to the male leader in rural villages. Women were further empowered not only through rural associations such as the *Saemaul Wives' Club* and *Mothers' Club*, but also through their collective role in increasing household income through sideline work as wage earners in *Saemaul* factories and through spearheading household frugality campaigns that promulgated thrift-oriented behaviors such as abstinence from alcohol and gambling and avoidance of expenditure on lavish ceremonies honoring one's ancestors.

Another factor that helped propel the SU movement was then-President Park Chung Hee himself. An authoritarian ruler with a rural background, he was determined to implement CDD in rural villages by means of political influence and authoritarian rule. In this task he was assisted by a willing and efficient government bureaucracy, and perhaps more importantly, mass education of the people—and women in particular—during the 1970s.

Saemaul education was likewise an important factor in promoting widespread participation in the SU movement. This was particularly true of the training camp system at the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders. During the SU movement's Stage III (dissemination), the ranks from which participants at the training institute were drawn expanded from *Saemaul* leaders in rural villages and local administrative officers to members of the urban elite, the latter even including high-ranking government officials, *chaebol* (large industrial conglomerate group) executives, entrepreneurs who had started small- and medium-sized businesses, university professors, student leaders, lawyers, and medical doctors. Dissemination of SU success stories by the state-controlled media was likewise an important factor in increasing the popularity of the SU movement.

Lastly, SU participation was facilitated by availability of resources and financing for SU projects. As for funding sources, community investment (including self-support by village residents) and loans from public financial institutions both grew during the late 1970s. Together these formed the mainstay of financial support for the SU movement, with aggregate funding from these two sources ultimately surpassing direct government support from both national and local government budgets.

In sum, the SU movement improved both individual and community well-being through

- (i) poverty reduction through its impacts on increasing household income;
- (ii) access to modern infrastructure and services brought about through mechanized farming, electrification, improvement in the quality of housing and health services, and child care provided by *Saemaul* nurseries during the planting, cultivation, and harvesting seasons;
- (iii) empowerment of local communities and amassing of social capital;
- (iv) revitalization of community leadership by permitting younger people to assume leadership roles traditionally held by senior members of society and creation of a status-free social context within the traditional rural village setting; and
- (v) acceptance of modern roles for women in terms of overall social participation, management of household budgets, and part-time employment as wage earners.

Lessons learned from the SU movement that may to some degree be successfully replicated elsewhere given appropriate adaptation include the following:

- (i) Infusing traditional societies with the attributes of diligence, self-help, and cooperation can facilitate social and economic transformation. In some contexts, training camp education may be of use in this regard.
- (ii) Introducing male–female paired leadership in rural villages can empower women and facilitate transformation and modernization of traditionally gender-biased Asian societies.
- (iii) Provision of microfinance through institutions such as the Saemaul Bank (Village Bank) can effectively provide low-income communities

with credit that can be used to leverage personal resources into investment that ultimately raises rural household incomes.

- (iv) Traditional cultural values and folkways can be of use in propelling socioeconomic change, given that they are appropriately revitalized, transformed, and modernized.
- (v) The top-down command-and-control approach to government involvement in CDD projects should be avoided at all costs, as this negates empowerment of local communities.
- (vi) Quantitative monitoring and evaluation of results of CDD programs by government

administrations should be avoided, as it likewise negates empowerment of local communities.

- (vii) Strong national political leadership with a commitment to sustainable CDD and empowerment of local communities can help facilitate socioeconomic transformation in Asian developing countries.
- (viii) CDD leaders must be carefully screened if abuse of administrative power that negates local community empowerment is to be avoided.
- (ix) There exists no standardized blueprint for CDD projects, as such an approach can likewise be at odds with empowerment of local communities.

Introduction

1. The Republic of Korea's *Saemaul* (New Village) *Undong* (Movement) (often referred to as "the SU movement") is a classic example of community-driven development (CDD) based on specific institutional principles and community participation. (Ha 2010, So 2007, Jun 2006, and North Gyeongsang Province 2008). The country's experience with the SU movement provides important lessons for ongoing CDD programs in developing countries in Asia and the Pacific. This report describes the SU movement as implemented under the government of President Park Chung Hee from 1971 to 1979. During this period, the Government of the Republic of Korea actively promoted the SU movement in three successive stages. Stage I (1971–1973) focused on provision and upgrading of basic rural infrastructure, while the focus of Stage II (1974–1976) was overall social and economic development. During Stage III (1977–1979), the movement's chief focus shifted to dissemination, by which is meant broadening of the populace who embraced the principles that led to the movement's success in both the medium and long term.

Scope of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement

2. The SU movement was spawned in the early 1970s as a response to what then seemed to be endemic rural poverty in the Republic of Korea (D.K. Kim 2005). The increasing urban wage levels that resulted from the government's focus on industrialization during its first (1962–1966) and second (1967–1971) five-year economic development plans sharply contrasted with the relatively slow rate of growth of incomes in the rural sector. This widening rural–urban wage differential caused awareness of rural poverty to become an increasingly prominent issue in the public psyche. Thus if for no other reason, SU CDD projects were an important feature of government policy in that they helped close the country's rural–urban wage gap, thereby dampening rural–urban migration. More broadly, the fact that they increased the rate of growth of rural

household income to a point where the rural–urban wage differential was ultimately closed also helped fuel rapid growth in per capita income levels for the nation overall (C.Y. Kim 2006).

3. To properly promote the SU movement, new administrative units were created in local government agencies and central government ministries that related to the operations essential to the movement's success. *Saemaul* promotional councils were formed in the national capital and at the provincial level to properly coordinate SU activities in both the public and private sectors. The two ideological tenets of the SU movement that functioned as its operating principles were then institutionalized. These were (i) the "*Saemaul* spirit," which embraced the development-friendly attributes of diligence, self-help, and cooperation; and (ii) widespread acceptance of the notion that "heaven helps those who help themselves" (Goh 2010).

4. Stage I (1971–1973) SU movement projects built and upgraded basic rural infrastructure. They included, for example, establishment or expansion of village path networks, upgrading of small stream beds to increase availability of water for irrigation, and construction of community facilities. During Stage II (1974–1976), the focus of the movement shifted to that of expanding agricultural output and included activities such as construction of farm roads, alignment of farmland, and mechanization of agricultural production. Tangible outputs of the SU movement soon appeared in the form of rehabilitation of rural village agricultural production infrastructure, improvement in village living environments, and increases in rural household income. Improving the village living environment included projects that modernized housing, such as replacing thatched roofs with tin, tile, or slate coverings; modernizing kitchen facilities; and upgrading overall living conditions by means of electrification and introduction of telecommunications on a mass scale in rural villages. While these latter changes brought about a revolutionary change in village

life, forestation programs beautified village environments, further expanded the supply of water available for agricultural production, and prevented loss of fertile topsoil through erosion and flooding.

5. Perhaps even more important to the long-term growth of the Republic of Korea were the changes the SU movement brought about in the people's overall mentality. Ultimately, the SU movement built a national confidence infused with a "can-do" spirit that transformed the former national mindset of chronic defeatism into new hope, a shared vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthusiasm propelled by volunteerism at the community level. This was a particularly important aspect of the movement's Stage III (1977–1979), during which the transformed character of rural communities was systematically spread from rural village settings into industrialized urban areas through the process commonly referred to as "dissemination." Supporting the achievement of these desirable goals was SU movement training and public education, which inculcated the people with the *Saemaul* spirit, the three most important components of which are diligence, self-help, and cooperation.

6. Following the end of the Park Chung Hee administration in 1979, a public sector organization known as *Saemaul Undong* Headquarters promoted the SU movement with government support throughout the 1980s. Since the 1990s, however, administration of the SU movement has been the responsibility of a privately funded nongovernment organization. The movement thus now functions entirely without government financial support. The narrative describing the evolution of the SU movement contained in this report excludes the period during which public and nongovernment organizations have led the movement.

Study Objectives and Method

7. Most researchers—political scientists in particular—have approached the SU movement as a government-driven mass political mobilization campaign. In large measure, the reason for this approach to analyzing the SU movement was that it was launched shortly before imposition of the authoritarian political system initiated by President Park Chung Hee under the undemocratic Yusin (revitalization) Constitution in 1972. However, it is important to note that while SU movement projects initially

received administrative and financial support from the government, the hallmark of the SU movement was community-driven socioeconomic development undertaken with community resources under *Saemaul* leadership. This is apparent from the fact that SU movement projects were not part of the complex of government-driven projects implemented under the third and fourth five-year economic development plans. Because community rather than central government resources were used to fund most SU projects, this report approaches the SU movement not from a political science perspective, but rather from a development economics CDD perspective.

8. The information regarding the SU movement presented in this report is based on a desk review of existing studies and reports documenting SU experiences, as well as primary data and information generated by means of qualitative interviews with key informants. Newspaper articles and two official data sources published by the government were used as basic information sources. These include the following: (i) news reports, feature articles, interviews, and academic discussions published in *The Seoul Daily News* during the period 1971–1973; (ii) the *Guidebook of the Saemaul Undong Movement* published by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1975; and (iii) the *Ten-Year History of the Saemaul Undong Movement*, which is a white paper published by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1980.

9. During the initial literature review, it became apparent that few studies approached the SU movement from a CDD perspective. This is consistent with the current emergence of a rethinking of the SU movement based on an economics rather than a political science perspective, which has resulted from the ongoing broader reevaluation of the economic achievements of the Park Chung Hee administration. The discourse relating to this new approach views the SU movement not as a mass political campaign, but instead as a development model that may contain valuable lessons for possible replication in modern-day Asian developing countries. The contribution of this paper is that it casts this discourse into the framework of the classic CDD model in order to facilitate sharing of knowledge relating to alternative approaches to economic development in modern-day developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

10. Interviews with two key high-level government officials involved in the SU movement and two former SU leaders active during the 1970s generated a significant amount of data and information

valuable to the study on which this report is based. Three researchers assisted in gathering data, providing valuable feedback regarding the research conducted, and in reviewing earlier drafts of this report.

Structure of the Report

11. **History of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement.**

This chapter begins with a historical sketch of the SU movement that includes a brief summary of the experiences of government- and nongovernment-sponsored community development programs. The latter include the Christian-oriented 4-H (Head, Heart, Hand, and Health) Club, the religious cooperatives that operated during the period of colonial administration, the postwar rehabilitation programs undertaken during the 1950s, and the programs implemented under the Six-Year Community Development Plan. All three stages of the SU movement and their relationship to the country's long-term development path are then discussed.

12. **Institutional Context of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement.** This chapter describes the administrative arrangements and implementation of the operating principles that shaped implementation of the SU movement on a day-to-day basis. The *Saemaul* spirit—based on diligence, self-help, and cooperation—as the guiding operational principle of the SU movement is then discussed. Finally, the contribution of *Saemaul* education including *Saemaul* leadership training is then reviewed.

13. **Outcomes of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement.** This chapter discusses the achievements of the SU movement in terms of both tangible, physical results and the contribution to Republic of Korea's long-term economic development of the change in mentality brought about through the SU movement's three stages.

14. **Impact on Individual and Community Well-Being.** This chapter discusses the impact of the SU movement on individual and communal well-being is evaluated in terms of several standard economic development parameters. These include

- (i) poverty reduction through increase in household income,
- (ii) financing of rural productive activities,
- (iii) increase in the level of access to mechanized farming,

- (iv) electrification of households,
- (v) improvements in housing quality, and
- (vi) improvements in health services, including provision of nurseries for working mothers.

In addition to these standard parameters of economic development, this chapter evaluates the SU movement in terms of parameters unique to the SU movement itself:

- (i) empowerment of local communities,
- (ii) additions to the stock of social capital,
- (iii) growth of civil society organizations,
- (iv) regeneration of leadership by reversing traditional biases against youthful leaders and female leadership,
- (v) creation of a status-free village life,
- (vi) increases in female social participation, and
- (vii) expansion of the role of women in rural household management.

15. **The *Saemaul Undong* Movement's Participatory Approach to Development.** This chapter explores a facet of social participation not often addressed in developing-country contexts, which is coordination between the government and civil society. In the case of the SU movement, the chief vehicles for achieving this coordination included the *Saemaul* promotional councils; women's organizations; the election of female *Saemaul* leaders; *Saemaul* leadership training camps at the Training Institute for *Saemaul* Leaders; and media-based public education. This chapter also examines constraints to achieving such social participation and coordination between the government sector and civil society, interaction between the labor market and urbanization, and how criticism of the government was addressed.

16. **Factors Contributing to Community Participation in the *Saemaul Undong* Movement.** This chapter analyzes the five factors that contributed to community participation in the SU movement in both their functional and dysfunctional dimensions. These include the role of government, the influence of leadership, the role of women, ideological considerations, and availability of resources including financing.

17. **Conclusions and Recommendations.** This chapter summarizes the conclusions that may be drawn from implementation of the SU movement, and the implications of these for CDD initiatives in modern-day Asian developing countries.

History of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement

18. Traditionally, rural villages in the Republic of Korea have clung to centuries-old community cooperation folkways. *Kye* provides the best example of this, as it is the oldest community funding club still popular among the people. Similarly, the *ture* is a centuries-old labor cooperation organization for advancing the public interest of rural residents, as is the *pumassi*, which arranges mutual exchange of labor for purposes of reaping economies of scale in agricultural production. First introduced to the Republic of Korea during the early 15th century, the *hyangyag* was a private entity led by neo-Confucian *literati* in rural provinces of the People's Republic of China during the Song dynasty. This movement was later popularized by 16th-century neo-Confucian adherents who educated villagers in neo-Confucian ethics. President Park Chung Hee assessed all of these rural community cooperation traditions with a view to assessing their potential contribution to the SU movement. He knew that to be successful, the SU movement would require a spiritual foundation capable of mass appeal (Presidential Speech Collection 1980). Thus, the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and mutual cooperation) required for widespread acceptance of the SU movement were actually taken from centuries-old community cooperation traditions. President Park then revitalized and modernized these folkways so as to make them consistent with success of the SU movement on a mass scale.

Historical Context

19. Rural community development movements are not a new phenomenon in villages in the Republic of Korea. Such movements advanced by both government and nongovernment agencies predated the SU movement by many decades. The first rural community development movement advanced by a government agency appeared during the period of colonial administration in the 1920s (You 1986). Similarly, early nongovernment rural community

development movements were initiated by religious groups. These included the Christian 4-H (Head, Heart, Hand, & Health) Club movement and the *Chöndogyo's* Farmer's Association, which managed production, consumption, and finance for its members. Of these, the most successful nongovernment organization in rural communities was the 4-H Club, which was introduced to the country in 1927 by American missionaries. Ultimately, the 4-H Club was used as an umbrella organization under which youth aged 13–24 of both genders were organized for the purpose of implementing YMCA-based rural development programs such as road maintenance and cleaning of village environments. One of the beneficial effects of the 4-H movement on rural development in the country was that it mitigated against Confucian-influenced gender discrimination traditions. It is thus no accident that many SU leaders active during the 1970s were in fact former 4-H members.

20. Since 1925, various agriculture- and agribusiness-related nongovernment cooperatives have risen and waned in rural communities, these having been initiated by enlightened student leaders and religious organizations. However, during the period of colonial administration, all nongovernment cooperatives in rural villages in the country were eventually forced to join the semigovernmental financial cooperative. That said, today these agriculture-based cooperatives carry on their work as the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the National Fishery Cooperative Federation. Both of these organizations have their roots in the financial cooperative, but have been revitalized following establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Today, both are major funding sources for agriculture and fishery projects in the country. While the nongovernment community development movements, including the 4-H Club and various private cooperatives, had some degree of success in improving rural standard of living, by the 1960s they had yet to resolve the fundamental problems of rural villages, which were chronic poverty and overall lack of sophistication.

21. Following the war (1950–1953), the government pursued a variety of rural community development programs (Ministry of Home Affairs 1980). During the early 1950s, the government planned a rural development movement as one of a number of postwar rehabilitation programs on the suggestion of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Beginning in 1953, this movement was initiated on a pilot basis under which some small-scale programs were implemented.

22. In September 1958, the government implemented an expanded rural development program that instituted modern agricultural technology, social welfare organizations, and public health and hygiene programs in 2,137 sample villages. Implemented under the guidance of 887 instructors, this initiative was financed from a pool of funds donated by the countries that then composed the United Nations forces in the Republic of Korea.

23. Full-scale implementation of the above programs only occurred in 1965, which marked the establishment of the Rural Development Agency, under which all rural development programs were integrated under the Six-Year Rural Development Plan (1966–1971). The three major objectives of this ambitious plan included (i) establishing democratic leadership in the nation's rural communities, (ii) increasing household income through modernization of agricultural production and mobilization of rural resources including labor, and (iii) encouraging self-help efforts by residents of rural communities. Ultimately, this plan implemented a total of 640,556 projects, of which 233,553 received financial support from the government. However, due to the ambitiousness of the plan, not all of its goals were fulfilled. This was for the most part true because the plan attempted to fulfill its objectives mentioned above unilaterally and simultaneously in all of the nation's 33,100 villages.

The Launch

24. While the government's industrialization-oriented First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–1966) was widely successful in terms of raising urban income levels, it ultimately led to a widening disparity between rural and urban incomes, which in turn fueled rapid rural–urban migration. In addition

to the problems caused by the resulting rapid urbanization, rural–urban migration caused the relative socioeconomic status of rural residents to worsen during the late 1960s. This is apparent from the fact that the rural population—and in particular its youthful segment—continued to shrink from its maximum of 16 million rural residents recorded in 1967. This growing imbalance between income growth rates in urban and rural areas caused the Park Chung Hee administration to persistently pursue rural development in tandem with urban industrialization programs during both the first and second five-year plans. The attention the Park Chung Hee administration paid to rural development is of particular importance, given that all preceding government-sponsored rural community development programs had failed to solve the country's chronic rural poverty problem.

25. In formulating the SU movement, President Park took account of two important lessons that emerged from the 1968 Special Projects for Increasing Rural Household Incomes Program. First, government subsidies lead to increased rural household debt if farmers do not adopt a spirit of diligence, self-help, and cooperation. Second, the stance of local government officials toward rural development programs is decisive in the success or failure of such initiatives. Thus, while the five-year economic development plans successfully employed a top-down approach driven by the central government, to be successful the SU movement would—at least theoretically—have to be a nationwide CDD campaign implemented from the bottom up.

26. Historically, the first reference to the SU movement as a possible solution to rural poverty problem was made by President Park Chung Hee during a now-famous speech he delivered to the provincial government leaders meeting in the southeastern city of Pusan on 22 April 1970. During the speech, President Park made reference to a “New Village Remodeling Movement,” which was historically the first reference to the SU movement (Presidential Secretariat 1980). “There is no hope in the village where villagers' yearning [for a better life] is not evident” he declared. “If the villagers [themselves] initiate a development initiative, the village community can complete it in 2 or 3 years with only a small amount of government subsidy. It is the responsibility of local government officials to encourage the villagers in

this regard. Rural poverty should not be viewed as a pre-destined outcome, but rather confronted with a spirit of self-help and self-support. In the near future, all villages could be well-kept communities. Why not build a village road and bridge within this coming year with your own resources? You could refer to such an initiative as a 'Village Remodeling Movement' or a 'Making Your Village Comfortable Movement.'" In his speech, President Park acknowledged that when he visited Sindo-ri Village Chongdo-eup, Chongdo-gun, in Gyeongsang North Province in July 1969, he was impressed with that community's rapid recuperation from the monsoon flood damage it had previously endured, and that this success could never have been achieved without the diligence, self-help, and cooperation of the villagers themselves. Shortly after President Park gave this speech, the government supplied each of the nation's 33,267 villages with 335 bags of cement and 0.5 tons of iron rods under the first experimental community-driven development (CDD) program. Ultimately, approximately 16,600 villages completed CDD projects with their own financial and labor resources (Jun 2010).

27. The SU movement has often been interpreted as being politically motivated actions driven by President Park's ambitious goals of modernizing the Republic of Korea in order to make it rich and to abolish the chronic poverty that had traditionally plagued its rural villages (Lie 1998). This tendency toward a political interpretation of Park's founding of the SU movement has traditionally been reinforced by the fact that promoting the SU movement would require a political system capable of sufficient marshaling of resources to achieve rapid economic development and national solidarity as a defense against the country's communist neighbor to the north.

28. In order to create such a political system, President Park suspended the Constitution on October 17, 1972 by declaring martial law and dismissing the National Assembly. A draft of the Yusin (revitalization) Constitution was subsequently adopted by an emergency cabinet and later approved by a national referendum. The Yusin Constitution maximized presidential power by (i) giving the president

authority to issue emergency decrees, to disband the National Assembly at will, and to appoint one third of all lawmakers; and (ii) by creating a 6-year presidential mandate without term limitation.

29. Under the Yusin Constitution, the president was to be indirectly elected by 2,359 nonpartisan delegates drawn from small constituencies that could be easily controlled by the government. In December 1972, these delegates of the new National Conference for Unification re-elected Park Chung Hee as a virtually omnipotent president. In taking these dramatic steps, Park evidently believed that he could justify not only the undemocratic military coup he led in 1961, but also the authoritarian political system he created with the Yusin Constitution, if he could successfully implement his economic development programs, of which the SU movement was one. Because one means of vindicating the rather draconian measures he had implemented would be to achieve rapid rural economic development, improved quality of life in rural communities became the initial goal of the SU movement.

30. The SU movement thus came to embrace four major government-defined objectives that were to lead to a better quality of life in rural areas: modernizing infrastructure, raising household incomes, reforesting mountains, and improving the overall rural environment.¹ In order to fulfill these four objectives, the SU movement formulated a series of projects that would support their fulfillment. Examples include projects for

- (i) modernizing rural production infrastructure such as road networks;
- (ii) updating agricultural infrastructure;
- (iii) introducing electrification and telecommunications on a mass basis;
- (iv) increasing rural incomes through increased productivity and recursive investment;
- (v) forestation projects for profit, raising the water table, erosion control, and fuel replacement; and
- (vi) welfare and environment projects to address poor housing and sanitation conditions and build community facilities.

¹ The traditional *ondol* floor of the living room in houses in the Republic of Korea is heated during the cold winter season with firewood cut from mountains. The mountain forest cover has been expanding since the 1970s when government ordered coal or fuel oil to be used for heating *ondol* rooms.

Long-Term Development Plan

31. In 1973, following the appearance of the first tangible results of the SU movement, the government designed a long-term plan for its implementation. The tangible results referred to above were the result of a set of projects and programs that the government came to label as Stage I (1971–1973) of the SU movement.

32. The objective of these projects and programs—which collectively comprised the efforts of an annual average of 36.16 million participants—was the building and upgrading of basic rural infrastructure. Examples of these village-level projects and programs include village forestation, broadening of entrance roads leading to villages, upgrading stream beds by building embankments to prevent flooding, building compost storage facilities, dredging ditches for drainage and other purposes, repairing pumps for drawing water from wells, repairing sewerage facilities, establishing communal laundry facilities, and catching and disposing of rats. Funding for Stage I projects and programs came mainly from rural residents (W113 billion), and to a much lesser extent from government subsidies (W28.9 billion).

33. Projects such as improving village entrance roads and farm roads enabled automobile transport and mechanized farming. Replacement of thatched roofs with tin, tile, and slate coverings gave SU villages a more modern appearance. In addition to the income-generating aspects of SU projects, rural household income was likewise increased through nonagricultural employment at newly established government-subsidized *Saemaul* factories and projects such as stream bed improvement and seeding (Ministry of Home Affairs 1980).

34. Further, government-financed projects that complemented the SU projects by improving the borders of national highways and stream embankments increased the household income of 1,182 villagers through nonagricultural employment. These complementary projects also provided temporary employment to numerous villagers during the construction phase of these projects.

35. By 1971, three lessons had emerged from implementation of these village-level projects that were relevant to the design, implementation, and ultimate success of the SU movement: (i) competent

village leaders were required for success of the movement at the local level, (ii) success of the movement equally depended on active engagement of village residents, and (iii) government subsidies to the movement should be allocated among villages on a competitive basis.

36. In response to the three lessons that emerged from its initial implementation, in 1972 the government made the following changes to the SU movement:

- (i) In order to upgrade its cadre of village-level SU movement leadership, the government established the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders in Suwon, a suburb of Seoul.
- (ii) A supplementary material subsidy of 500 bags of cement and 1 ton of iron rods was awarded to each of the 16,600 villages that were top-rated with regard to performance in implementing their initial SU projects. Since there were 6,108 villages that did *not* receive the subsidy, 22,708 villages, or 68% of the country's total of 33,267 villages, participated in Stage I of the SU movement.
- (iii) Top priority for electrification was given to the *Saemaul* villages that were the most successful in implementing their Stage I projects. This allowed electrification to reach 40% of all villages in the Republic of Korea.
- (vi) Following the SU movement's designation as a top government priority, the Saemaul Central Promotional Council as well as sub-councils for each level of local government administration were established, effectively creating an SU movement interministerial policy coordination system at the national level.
- (v) The government published the *General Record of the SU Movement* as well as a *Saemaul* song, which was written and composed by President Park.

37. In 1973, the government reorganized the central and local levels of SU movement administration by making the following changes:

- (i) *Saemaul* guidance sections were introduced into local SU movement administration agencies, and *Saemaul* staffs were assigned to the ministries of agriculture and fisheries, commerce and industry, and education, and to the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation.

- (ii) The first National Saemaul Leaders Conference was held in November in Kwangu city, where the Saemaul Order of Merit was enacted.
- (iii) The Ministry of Home Affairs ranked all villages in the nation in terms of their performance in implementing SU projects, and distributed 500 bags of cement and 0.5 ton of iron rods to the top 16,600 villages.
- (iv) Each SU project was assigned to one of the three following categories: basic projects, wage-earning support and cultural welfare projects, and household income-generating projects.
- (v) SU consultants were assigned to each of the 138 “self-reliance villages” (i.e., villages “that showed excellent performance in terms of the SU Spirit”). One village in each county received this designation.

38. The objectives of Stage II were increasing household income by standardizing agricultural production infrastructure, developing agribusinesses, and developing both “self-help villages and medium-grade villages in terms of the *Saemaul* spirit.” In 1974, the government became more actively involved in the SU movement. *Saemaul* Day was observed on the first day of each month, and Neighborhood Meeting Day on the 25th of each month. *Saemaul* briefing rooms and publicity halls were set up for the purpose of promoting the SU movement at local SU administration agencies. *Saemaul* education, including training programs for *Saemaul* leaders, was extended to include members of the urban elite in both the public

and private sectors. This included government officials, business leaders, the media, academia, and religious officials. *Saemaul* education was thus extended to every corner of the society. As a result, participation in the movement grew rapidly.

39. In 1975, civilian *Saemaul* promotional councils were organized as the SU movement became more active in urban communities. By this time, increases in both agricultural output and nonagricultural income in the rural sector had caused the average level of rural household income to approach parity with that of urban workers. Thus by 1976, the urban SU movement had become fully activated

40. Stage III of the SU movement’s long-term development plan focused on expanding the number of self-reliant villages through increases in rural household income derived from animal husbandry or other agriculture-related activities, as well as from manufacturing output at *Saemaul* factories. As forestation was completed in 1977, which was much earlier than originally scheduled, the scale of the SU cooperation projects was expanded to include modernization of intervillage structures and construction of bridges and roads. Following formation of the Saemaul Factory Movement Headquarters in 1977, an environment preservation campaign that addressed industrial pollution was initiated in 1978 with the promulgation of the Nature Protection Charter. With the assassination of Park Chung Hee in October 1979, Stage III of the SU movement’s government-directed era came to an end.

Institutional Context of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement

41. Averaging 50 households, a *maul* (traditional rural village in the Republic of Korea) is not always identical with the lowest level of governmental administration, which is known as the *ri* or *dong*, since in many cases a *ri* or *dong* comprises more than one *maul*. This distinction is important because the *maul* rather than the *ri* or *dong* was the basic strategic unit of the SU movement (Goh 2010). During the 1970s, *mauls* were geographically categorized into five groups: (i) open-field villages, (ii) hillside villages, (iii) mountain villages, (iv) fishing villages, and (v) suburban villages. The strategy of the SU movement was that each of these five categories of villages would implement a set of projects that corresponded to the comparative advantage of each village type. Each of these categories of villages embraced its own unique set of traditions.

42. This chapter describes the SU movement's institutional arrangements, operating principles, and system of *Saemaul* education.

Administrative Arrangements

43. As previously mentioned, the administrative style of the SU movement during the 1970s mirrored that of the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung Hee. Thus during this period, the SU movement was administered in a hierarchical manner by means of an administrative pyramid that comprised ministries of the central government as well as all levels of government administration including that of the province, the city-county, the town-*myon*, and the village-*ri*. In tandem with this hierarchical administrative structure, the government organized government-civilian committees for mobilizing villagers and workers at each level of government administration. Financing for SU projects in rural communities was thus provided by the government-controlled National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and National Fishery Cooperative Federation, as well as public financial institutions (Chung 2009).


Government Operation

44. At the central government level, the Ministry of Home Affairs controlled the SU movement's local administrative agencies. In 1971, a *Saemaul* director position was established under the director-general of the local administrative bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This allowed creation of *Saemaul* divisions at each level of local SU movement administrative agencies. The newly created Office of the Saemaul Director, under the director-general of the local administrative bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, had overall responsibility for the SU movement. At all levels of local SU administrative bodies, *Saemaul* comprehensive briefing rooms were set up under the offices of all deputy governors and mayors. In short, administration of the SU movement by the government was initially centralized within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic representation of the government administrative structure as it related to the SU movement during the 1970s.

45. In 1973, SU-related divisions were created in a number of central government ministries. These included the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Energy and Resources. These new SU-related divisions included the following:

- (i) the Division of Saemaul Income under the Bureau of Agricultural Development at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,
- (ii) the Division of Processed Food under the Bureau of Small- and Medium-Scale Industries as well as the Division of Telephone Services for Farming and Fishing Communities under the Bureau of Power Development at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
- (iii) the Saemaul Education Office under the Chief School Commissioner's Office at the Ministry of Culture and Education, and

Figure 1. Government Organizations Related to the Saemaul Undong Movement



- (iv) the Division of Regional Welfare under the Bureau of Social Affairs at the Ministry of Public Health and Society.

46. The government officials assigned to the new *Saemaul*-related divisions and sections were recruited from an elite corps of civil servants within the ministries concerned and were favored with respect to promotions for their service in their *Saemaul*-related posts. As a result, local administrative agencies followed these same principles in staffing their SU-related positions. Further, these *Saemaul*-related positions were given a great deal of flexibility with respect to their budgetary allocations. These arrangements enabled smooth coordination not only between ministries, but also between government agencies and public organizations such as the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the National Fishery Cooperative Federation.

47. Given that implementation of SU projects was ultimately the responsibility of residents of rural communities, government intervention was to be limited to administrative guidance, financial support, technological assistance, and monitoring. That said, there was ultimately a significant amount of interaction between local administrative officers and community leaders at the village level.

Government–Civilian Coordination

48. In 1972, the *Saemaul* promotional councils were organized for the purpose of facilitating coordination between the government and civil society. These councils operated at the central, provincial, county, town, and village levels. Given the relatively rapid increase in the number and scale of SU projects during the 1970s, the *Saemaul* promotional councils played an increasingly important role in coordinating SU project planning and implementation as they related both to the various levels of government and the communities that ultimately implemented these projects.

49. The *ri/dong* development committee (village committee), which was the lowest level of village administration of the SU movement, implemented the SU projects under the leadership of the village chief, the latter being nominated by both the government and the *Saemaul* leaders who were directly elected by villagers. The *up/myon* implementation committee (town committee) addressed SU project


implementation bottlenecks as noted by community members in consultation with *Saemaul* leaders and local administrative officials. The county committee provided guidance to, and coordinated, the SU movement at the regional community level under guidance of the mayor and local administrative officials. The provincial committee created a comprehensive plan for the SU movement in the province concerned under the guidance of the governor, the provincial administration, and educational leaders, which included the deputy governor, superintendent, university professors, agricultural or fishery cooperative provincial managers, and local broadcasting company managers.

50. The *Saemaul* Central Promotional Council, which was the highest-level committee of the SU movement, coordinated planning and implementation of the SU movement overall. The council therefore comprised the minister of home affairs; other cabinet-level ministers including the deputy prime minister of the Economic Planning Board, as well as the ministers of finance, national defense, education, agriculture and fisheries, commerce and industry, construction, health and social affairs, transportation, communication, culture and information; and *Saemaul* leaders drawn from the nongovernment sector. Figure 2 presents a diagrammatic representation of policy coordination among *Saemaul* promotional councils.

51. ***Saemaul* promotional council at the town (*up, myon*) level.** The *Saemaul* promotional council at the town level (SPCT) was the base organization for coordination between the government and the community coordination. Chaired by the town mayor, the council also comprised the deputy town mayor, the police chief, elementary and secondary school principals, the town-level rural community promoter, the town-level officers of the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives, the town postmaster, and *Saemaul* leaders. These were the community's opinion makers and representatives of the community's interests. In short, the members of this council represented the agencies in the local community that guided, supported, and sustained the SU movement at the town level.

52. The SPCT evaluated the villagers' needs and the resources the village had at its disposal in planning the budget, materials, and labor required for

Figure 2: Policy Coordination among Saemaul Promotional Councils



implementing SU projects at the local community level and for allocating SU projects among village implementation units. *Saemaul* education was an important qualification for serving on the SPCT in that it helped ensure proper participation by all members of the local community.

53. ***Saemaul* promotional council at the county level.** The *Saemaul* promotional council at the county level (SPCC), which represented the next higher level of SU administration after the SPCT, was chaired by the county mayor and likewise comprised the county superintendent, the chief of the police station, the county rural community promoter, the county officers of the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives, the agricultural high school principal, and the county postmaster. Half of the county council members were drawn from the agriculture sector since a major objective of the SU movement was that of increasing rural household income. Nevertheless, local administrative leaders such as the county mayor, the chief of the police station, and the county superintendent were key members of the council, as they linked with the *Saemaul* promotional councils at the central and provincial levels of government.

54. The SPCC evaluated the county's development potential against its resource endowment and decided which SU projects were the most appropriate for the county to undertake. The SPCC guided and coordinated the SU movement at the village level through the county-level administrative agencies with respect to financing, material, and technological resources. It likewise encouraged participation in the SU movement by the rural population, particularly with regard to projects that built or upgraded basic infrastructure. Similarly, the SPCC presented *Saemaul* education programs and introduced modern agricultural technology to community members through *Saemaul* leaders. Finally, the SPCC estimated the likely future achievements of SU projects and analyzed the factors likely to either propel or constrain the success of SU initiatives.

Saemaul Democracy

55. Unlike village chiefs who were nominated by the government, *Saemaul* leaders were democratically elected by local residents at village general

meetings (VGMs), the latter being a newly institutionalized arrangement under the SU movement. All SU projects were planned, discussed, monitored, and evaluated by village community members themselves at these meetings. Interestingly, each village elected both a male and a female leader to serve the SU movement at the local level. This latter arrangement encouraged societal modernization by going against the Confucian tradition of male domination of administrative structures that remained prevalent during the early 1970s.

56. ***Saemaul* leaders.** The qualifications for *Saemaul* leadership were exacting. A *Saemaul* leader had to have

- (i) been born in the village concerned;
- (ii) a passion for rural community development;
- (iii) been a graduate of a vocational school with an agriculture or fisheries curriculum;
- (iv) good judgment, patience, compassion, and a cooperative spirit;
- (v) creative ideas;
- (vi) a disposition that respected the opinions of others;
- (vii) devotion to duty and service;
- (viii) a diligent and sincere character, as well as good physical health; and
- (ix) the ability to be self-supporting (Ministry of Home Affairs 1975).

57. Most *Saemaul* leaders had some formal education, as 57.2% of them had attended secondary school. Given the lower average educational level of *Saemaul* leaders in rural communities, their presence sometimes discouraged more highly educated members of the local community from participating in the SU movement.

58. The age composition of the SU leadership was skewed toward the young, as 24.0% of *Saemaul* leaders were aged 36–40 and 26.4% were aged 41–45. Often, the nation's seniority-oriented community leaders were replaced by younger persons. Given the progressive and forward-looking leadership style of younger persons as well as their relative lack of experience, in some cases the SU *Saemaul* leaders played a key role in planning SU projects and activities. However, this was done in consultation with local administrative officers, particularly with regard to matters relating to government

financing, technical assistance, and implementation of the projects and activities decided upon at the VGMs. Given that the leaders maintained close contact with local administrative officers and technical assistants, and that they had graduated from programs taught at the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders, they had access to agricultural production technologies that could increase rural household incomes. Moreover, at town-, county-, and provincial-level council meetings, they represented the interests of their own villages and reported their activities to their respective VGMs.

59. **Village general meetings.** Discussions at VGMs typically focused on operational matters relating to planning or implementation of SU projects. During the 1960s, such issues were generally addressed by the village development committee (VDC), which was usually chaired by the village chief, a folkway consistent with the Confucian tradition of honoring those more senior to oneself. Under the SU movement, however, the newly organized VGMs used a much more democratic decision-making process. At VGMs, all village issues were put to a majority vote by community residents. While more time-intensive than allowing the village chief to make all decisions, this more democratic method of decision making adopted by the SU encouraged conscious participation by all members of the community.

60. VGMs addressed issues relating to the long-term development of the village concerned; planning and evaluating SU projects; acquisition, management, and sale of *Saemaul* village assets; enactment and revision of *Saemaul* regulations; electing *Saemaul* leaders; and virtually any other issue impacting the welfare of the village at large. Each household had one vote in these proceedings. Both the *Saemaul* leaders and the VGM chair were responsible for ensuring a quorum at the VGM and for moderating discussions in a manner that gave all in attendance an opportunity to voice their opinions on each issue discussed (Ministry of Home Affairs 1975).

61. **Village development committee.** The village development committee (VDC) was reorganized in a manner that downplayed its former decision-making role, and instead assigned it an executive role as compared with the VGM, a voting body responsible for decision making. The VDC was generally chaired by the village chief or *Saemaul* leader and comprised approximately 15 members,

most of whom were village opinion leaders. In many cases, *Saemaul* leaders chaired the VDC in order to encourage voluntary participation in village SU activities. The VDC also supervised various organizational units such as the Youth Club, the Women's Club, the Agricultural Progress Club, the village bank, and the village library. Thus, despite its role as a local government agency, the VDC encouraged voluntary participation in the SU movement (Ministry of Home Affairs 1980).

62. Because the SU movement required voluntary participation and creative behavior on the part of the village, the VDC promoted democratic principles in the supervision of village organizations. VDC officers also preserved the trust of villagers by maintaining good relationships with them and by systematically avoiding selecting projects for implementation without their consent. Because the VDC partly financed shortfalls in the labor and material required for implementing SU projects, it continually evaluated the achievements of SU projects against the village's short- and long-term development plans. Finally, in the *Saemaul* training programs it presented, the VDCs stressed creative and voluntary participation by all members of the rural community.

Operating Principles: The *Saemaul* Spirit

63. The SU movement continually promoted the three character traits that comprised the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) in order to encourage new ways of thinking consistent with modernization based on traditional work ethics. In short, the *Saemaul* spirit imbued the society overall with a "can-do" stance toward adversity and any obstacle encountered on the way to achieving proclaimed goals (Goh 2010). This was in part responsible for the country's resolving its chronic annual spring food shortfall syndrome known as *poritkoge* ("barley hump"), a symbolic reference to subsisting on barley alone as opposed to rice, the preferred grain food of the people. Further, the SU movement was responsible for the sweeping change in the behavior of villagers that took place during the course of SU implementation, which transformed the rural society from a people focusing on self-defeat, helplessness, and selfishness to one of diligence, self-help, and cooperation. Implementation of SU projects in

large measure facilitated this change by producing tangible results of community efforts.

64. **Diligence.** Diligence, a character trait advocated under the traditional work ethic, was included as a component of the *Saemaul* spirit in order to encourage voluntary participation in SU project implementation by all community members. As a rejoinder to the chronic unemployment that prevailed during the agricultural off-season in rural villages, the SU movement responded with the proverb, “Early birds collect more food,” the origin of which was the inevitable operational principle necessary for the survival of rural villagers suffering from chronic poverty. In addition to diligence, sincerity, and frugality, perseverance as well as social trust and justice were promoted under the SU movement, these being virtues necessary for success in capitalistic societies.

65. **Self-help.** In the early 1970s, rural dwellers in the Republic of Korea who had abandoned any hope of a better life easily responded to the well-known Western proverb, “Heaven helps those who help themselves.” With the government providing financial incentives to those who helped themselves, rural communities came to compete with one another for support from the government, which under the SU movement was awarded on a competitive basis. When government subsidies were won by a particular village, these were invested in one or more of three categories of collective investment activities: basic, self-help, and self-reliance.

66. The notion of self-help transformed the former rural mentality of dependency into a mind set of self-assured capability in developing and managing *Saemaul* projects. With the tangible results of these projects increasingly becoming visible, the villagers’ confidence in the SU movement grew. As of result of this transformation, the term “*Saemaul* spirit” was nicknamed the “can-do” spirit.

67. **Cooperation.** Without cooperation among villagers, diligence and self-help were insufficient to achieve the objectives of the SU movement. Thus, the SU spirit of cooperation expressed the notion of synergy (the whole being greater than the sum of its parts) as this relates to productivity in both agricultural and industrial settings.

Saemaul Education

68. It was through *Saemaul* education that the SU movement was able to get the people to adopt the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) as character traits natural to the entire society, and to automatically presume that these would maximize the impact of adopting modern technologies in both agriculture and industrial pursuits. Thus, both rural and urban community members, the latter including the urban elite, were well aware of the financial benefits of committing themselves to modifying the character of the country’s society as a whole.

Motivations and Target Audiences

69. *Saemaul* education was a vital component of the SU movement in that it was able to foster discipline among the rural population, to awaken in them the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit, and to educate them regarding the economic benefits of adopting modern agricultural and industrial technologies. With the Republic of Korea being threatened by its communist neighbor to the north in the wake of the fall of Viet Nam in 1975, the US Carter administration planning to end its military presence in the Republic of Korea in 1977, and demands for democratization from dissident leaders enraged by the Yusin Constitution, it was no secret that President Park Chung Hee dominated the nation by politically exploiting *Saemaul* education in a way that ensured support of a series of five-year economic development plans (D.K. Kim 2005).

70. The target audience of *Saemaul* education comprised people from all walks of life regardless of gender, age, social status, regional background, or religious belief. *Saemaul* education began by educating *Saemaul* leaders who were drawn from rural-community elites, cadres of local leaders, and local administrative officials. Later, members of the urban elite—including high-ranking officials of the central government, leaders from both the public and private sectors, and academic figures—all attended the same courses as rural community leaders, which were presented by the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders. As a result, more than 600,000 members of both the rural and urban elite were trained at the institute during the 1970s.

Training Program and Method

71. *Saemaul* education required all participants to remain at an isolated training camp together for a period of 1 week or even longer. The programs for the 1-week training camp that totaled 105 hours, as well as the 11-day program comprising 104 hours of instruction, are summarized in Boxes 1–3.

72. These education programs were designed to increase the understanding of participants regarding the moral aspect of the *Saemaul* spirit, how and why local community development takes place, and how *Saemaul* leadership is established. *Saemaul* education changed the overall attitude of participants by leading them through a cycle of stimulus, reflection, resolution, and practice. The participants were stimulated by

- (i) learning the realities of the country's society,
- (ii) reflecting on their lives up to the point at which they had entered *Saemaul* training,

- (iii) becoming determined to do whatever is required to achieve a new life, and finally,
- (iv) keeping promises with themselves to practice new behaviors.

73. The stories of the SU movement presented by *Saemaul* leaders hailing from rural villages were vivid aspects of *Saemaul* education. Such stories, which chronicled the struggles faced by *Saemaul* leaders in successfully implementing SU projects in the face of numerous obstacles, had wide appeal among participants, as did the group discussions that followed such presentations. The feedback provided during such sessions gave participants the opportunity to reflect on their own behavior patterns as a means of bringing about desirable changes in their current behavior.

Saemaul Leadership Training

74. *Saemaul* leaders came to understand how their values, attitude, passion, ideology, and morals might affect their ability to lead others. Desirable values for *Saemaul* leaders included the following:

Box 1: 1-Week Training Camp Course

Typical program for a 1-week training camp course totaling 105 hours.

- Enlightening the *Saemaul* spirit: 30 hours
- National security and economy: 10 hours
- Tour of SU sites: 10 hours
- Individual case studies of best practices of the SU movement: 20 hours
- Group discussion: 25 hours
- Recreation: 10 hours

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1975. *Guidebook of the Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 2: 11-Day Training Camp Course

Program for *Saemaul* leaders comprising 104 hours of instruction spread over 11 days.

- Indoctrination of the *Saemaul* spirit: 20 hours
- SU projects: 27 hours
- Group discussion: 18 hours
- Tour of SU sites: 18 hours
- Case studies of successful SU projects: 14 hours
- National security and economy: 7 hours

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1975. *Guidebook of the Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 3: Daily Schedule in Training Camp

05:50	Rise
06:00–06:30	Roll call, gymnastics, jogging
06:30–07:00	Washing, cleaning
07:00–08:00	Breakfast
08:00–09:00	Meditation, dialogue
09:00–12:50	Morning lectures
12:50–14:20	Lunch
14:20–18:10	Afternoon lectures
18:10–19:10	Dinner
19:10–22:30	Evening group discussion
22:30–22:40	Roll call
23:00	Sleep

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1975. *Guidebook of the Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

- (i) making decisions on the basis of willful and intentional analysis instead of being influenced by superstition,
- (ii) exercising rational judgment as opposed to being ruled by emotion,
- (iii) maintaining fairness in the recruitment of leaders and avoiding decisions driven by nepotism,
- (iv) maintaining passion for achievement in the face of adversity,
- (v) being self-assertive rather than aggressive,
- (vi) maintaining an orientation toward the future when thinking through decisions, and
- (vii) maintaining a democratic manner as opposed to an authoritarian stance.

75. Desirable sociopsychological qualities in *Saemaul* leaders were as follows (Ministry of Home Affairs 1980):

- (i) acquisitiveness,
- (ii) recognition,

- (iii) affiliation,
- (iv) cognizance,
- (v) achievement, and
- (vi) nurturance.

In contrast, undesirable sociopsychological qualities in *Saemaul* leaders were

- (i) abasement,
- (ii) aggression,
- (iii) dominance, and
- (iv) rejection.

In sum, *Saemaul* leaders needed to embody honesty and a justice-oriented system of ethics.

76. The ideological stance of *Saemaul* leaders was critical to the success of the SU movement, given the anticommunist stance of national security system in the Republic of Korea and the ever-present reality of a nation continually required to confront a rogue neighbor to the north.

Outcomes of the *Saemaul Undong* Movement

77. During the 1970s, the SU movement progressed from development of basic infrastructure in rural villages to development nationwide in both rural and urban areas. This chapter uses three separate stages, which differ slightly from the government's three-stage long-term development plan pursued under the SU movement, to describe the movement's outcomes. During Stage II (1974–1976), the focus was on upgrading agricultural production infrastructure, a broad category of works including renovation of rural housing, improvement in the environment, introduction of mechanized farming, and expanding income in agribusiness- and non-agribusiness-related productive activities in rural villages, the latter including *Saemaul* factories. Stage III (1977–1979) SU activities focused on dissemination, or extension of participation in the SU movement to the urban setting in both its public- and private-sector dimensions, (Chung 2009; Ministry of Home Affairs 1975, 1980).

Stage I: Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Income Generation

78. Given the backward state of agricultural production infrastructure in most rural villages in the early 1970s, Stage I (1971–1973) SU projects and activities focused on rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and rural income generation. In order to ensure efficient use of all available labor and resources, the SU movement enlisted both male and female *Saemaul* leaders in each village, these leaders being chosen by the villagers themselves.

Rehabilitation of Economic and Social Infrastructure

79. For basic agricultural production infrastructure, the SU movement focused on village rehabilitation. In short, this meant upgrading of housing facilities and of the village environment—the latter including lengthening and broadening of village paths;

upgrading stream beds and overpasses; constructing communal warehouses, workshops, barns, and compost storage facilities; replacing thatched roofs with tin, tile, or slate coverings; and introduction of electrification and residential telephone systems.

80. **Upgrading of village paths and streams.**

Broadened village paths facilitated pedestrian traffic, while upgraded overpasses enabled motor vehicles to transport agricultural products into and out of rural villages. Upgraded stream beds facilitated effective use of water by controlling floods during monsoon rains. In all, 21,634 kilometers (km) of village roads, including 9,624 km of roads built prior to the onset of the SU movement, were broadened in 1972. This completed 89% of the government's targeted total upgraded road length of 26,666 km. In 1973, an aggregate length of 10,862 km of village paths were upgraded, exceeding the government's then-targeted length by 10%. Then, during the period 1974–1980, 43,385 km of the nation's aggregate path length were broadened.

81. Villages in mountainous areas lie in narrow valleys with small streams that supply water for farming. Upgrading these stream beds by building embankments was vital to prevent rice paddies from flooding during monsoon rains. The results of the 1972 national survey showed that 17,239 km of stream beds, including 8,451 km of tiny streams, 5,733 km of small streams, and 3,053 km of mid-sized streams, were in need of embankments if flooding was to be prevented in their catchment areas. Under the SU movement during 1972–1980, 19,665 km of stream beds (114.1% of the targeted length of 17,239 km) were upgraded. The government funded works on small- and mid-sized streams wider than two meters (m) in association with funding by local residents. For the most part, cement provided under a government grant was used to perform these works.

82. **Community facilities.** Warehouses, workshops, barns, and compost storage facilities are

Table 1: Annual Achievement of Roof Replacement Projects (thousands of homes)

Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Units Replaced	423	476	401	338	466	494	30
Running Total	423	899	1,300	1,638	2,104	2,598	2,628

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs.

essential community infrastructure in rural villages. Thus, construction of communal warehouses for preserving agricultural products and storing equipment all contributed to increasing rural household incomes. Communal workshops reduced labor expenses for small-scale farming, while communal barns facilitated economies of scale in the use of labor and technology, as well as in the prevention of epidemics. Communal compost storage facilities were in high demand for organic fertilizer production, which is used to improve agricultural output.

83. Communal warehouses were used for preserving agricultural products such as rice, barley, beans, and potatoes, as well as for storing fertilizer, cement, and farming equipment. Most communal warehouses were located at the village square, near village entrances, or at road intersections. Standard sizes were 30–40 m² for 20 households, 90–120 m² for 60 households, and 150–200 m² for 100 households. Given the cold winters, these warehouses were built in concrete bases 100 centimeters (cm) deep with walls 15 cm thick, and slate roofs were extended with polystyrene foam, these specifications ensuring protection against excessive heat and moisture. Warehousing agricultural products and production materials on a communal basis minimized expenditure on storage fees, which were financed from village funds. Storage of agricultural products in warehouses allowed farmers to time the release of their goods in a way that maximized selling prices when their goods were brought to market. From 1972 to 1980, 22,143 communal warehouses were built in rural villages, which amounted to 64% of the target of 34,665 warehouses.

84. **Upgrading of residential housing.** For the most part, housing improvement projects were financed by the villagers themselves. These projects included replacing thatched roofs with tin, tile, or slate coverings; building water supply facilities

such as wells; and electrification. The demonstration-effect value of the thatched-roof replacement projects was an efficient way of expanding participation in the SU movement, upgrading housing by reducing the flammability of construction materials, reducing the material and labor costs of roof replacement (since thatched roofs had to be replaced annually), and releasing significant amounts of straw for a wide range of agribusiness uses including fabrication of straw bags for sale and recycling of used straw into compost.

85. In 1972, the first year in which the thatched roof replacement projects were implemented, 423,000 houses replaced thatched roofs with tin or slate coverings at a cost of W12.8 billion, W4.1 billion of this amount being provided by the government and W8.7 billion from villager self-financing. The project continued until 1978, when the target number of 2,456,000 houses was exceeded (Table 1).

Household Income-Generation Projects

86. Agricultural output and nonagricultural wages were the two primary sources of household income in most rural villages in the Republic of Korea. Income from agricultural output was mainly derived from rice production, sericulture (silk farming), beef-cattle husbandry, greenhouse farming of fruits and vegetables, and floriculture. In Stage I of the SU movement, the income-generating projects focused on introduction of high-yielding rice varieties, sericulture, *hanwu* (*wagyū*) beef-cattle husbandry, dairy farming, tea and ginseng cultivation, seaweed and oyster farming, greenhouse production of organically grown vegetables and tropical fruit, and floriculture. Many of these projects comprised efforts to address the rural sector's chronic high winter unemployment levels by encouraging wage-earning activities by rural residents during the agricultural off-season.

87. **Introduction of high-yielding rice varieties.** Since most of the income produced in agriculture sector was derived from rice production, introducing high-yielding rice varieties was an immediate priority of the SU movement in its efforts to increase rural household incomes. Introduction of *Tong il byo*, or “unification rice” seed, which was developed by Professor Ho Mun Hoe at Seoul National University in 1971, was a key Stage I SU project for increasing rural household income. Introduction of this rice seed—a hybrid of *Indica* rice varieties developed in the late 1960s at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, as well as another rice seed derived from *Japonica* varieties—generated a remarkable

increase in rice production during the 1970s. While rice farmers initially objected to the taste of unification rice, its introduction increased the average rice yield from 3.34 tons per hectare (ha) in 1972 to 4.94 tons per ha in 1977. This allowed the Republic of Korea to close its previous chronic rice supply deficit, and ultimately, its *poritkoge* food shortfall (barley hump).

88. **Greenhouse farming.** Given the country’s climatic conditions, fruit and vegetables cannot be produced year-round. During the 1960s, *kimchi* (spiced pickled cabbage or other vegetables) was the only source of vegetables during the winter. As a result, greenhouse farming was a popular

Box 4: Piloting Production of Unification Rice

Duri village, Paengsong-myon, Pyongtaek-gun, Gyeonggi-do

Of Duri’s 95 households, 93 derived the majority of their household income from rice production. The village’s farms averaged 1.2 hectares (ha) of arable land, most comprising rice paddies. In 1971, average annual household rice yield was only 3.21 tons per hectare. In 1972, the local *Saemaul* leader and guidance worker consented to providing a 10-ha site for a pilot project under which unification rice seed would be planted in Duri, this pilot site being operated by a group of 18 villagers. Despite unexpected problems, an average of 5.66 tons of rice per ha—a higher yield than the previous season’s 3.50 tons—were harvested. This proved the high-yield characteristic of the unification rice seed beyond any doubt during the first year of the experiment. In 1973, three more pilot sites were set aside for planting unification rice. In order to resolve the problems of *pumassi* (traditional labor swap) work allotment during the busy farming season, it was decided at the village general meeting to allot labor to the pilot scheme on the basis of age and gender criteria. That year, yields from the demonstration sites averaged 6.20 tons per ha.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 5: Piloting Greenhouse Farming

Panmun-dong village, Jinju City, South Gyeongsang Province

When vinyl and polyethylene were first produced in the Republic of Korea in 1953, a few pioneers started greenhouse farming of seasonal vegetables such as cucumber. In South Gyeongsang Province, which lies in the country’s warmer southern region, greenhouse farming became popular during the 1960s. As the SU movement began, greenhouse farmers in Panmun-dong village in Jinju City attempted to domestically cultivate expensive imported tropical fruits such as pineapple, citrus, melon, and even banana. Greenhouse technologies and management of pineapple farming in Panmun-dong was one of the SU movement’s pilot greenhouse farming schemes. The Panmun-dong greenhouse farmers selected a field of sandy earth to ensure good drainage and enriched the earth annually with compost. They then began producing pineapple seedlings, which previously were imported from Japan. They controlled the temperature and humidity carefully, maintaining the average temperature between 35°C and 50°C. They used urea-like growth promoters, and sprayed the seedlings with carbide solution to induce flowering. Through meticulous control of flowering through manipulation of ambient temperatures and agrochemicals, they were able to produce pineapple year-round. Greenhouse farming of tropical fruit was particularly profitable during the 1970s, as this subsector was heavily protected through import restrictions on tropical fruit until these were relaxed in the 1990s.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 6: Small Stream Bed Embankment Construction Project for Reducing Unemployment

Singi-ri village, Unbong-myon, Namwon-gun, North Jolla Province

At the end of 1974, the *Saemaul* leader from Singi-ri village was informed by the Unbong-myon office that the government wage-earning project budget of W500,000 could be allotted to the village if the villagers agreed on the project to be financed. At the village general meeting, the villagers selected a small stream embankment upgrading project for implementation and estimated the total expenses for upgrading approximately 150 meters of embankment at W600,000. The villagers then decided that the budgetary shortfall of W100,000 would be financed from village funds. After the contract for the Singi-ri Small Stream Mending Project between the Unbong-myon office and Singi-ri village was signed, the villagers began work on the embankment on 21 January 1975. Construction was completed in 30 days on 20 February by 500 workers at a total expense of W596,000. The budgetary shortfall of W96,000 was financed from village funds.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

way to produce high-profit agricultural and horticultural crops as well as vegetables year-round, particularly during the 1970s when the country protected its domestic agricultural products heavily. Greenhouses were built with vinyl or polyethylene in order to make the most efficient use of daylight. Various construction techniques were used to build greenhouses appropriate to particular uses, such as production of organically grown vegetables, tropical fruits, and flowers.

89. Special projects for the unemployed. Beginning in 1972, the government budget for rural unemployment during the agricultural off-season was put into various SU wage-earning projects that were planned and implemented by the Saemaul Central Promotional Council and the sub-councils at each level of local government administration. The types of projects thus financed ranged from social welfare projects for poor rural households administered by local governments and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to large construction projects administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Ministry of Construction.

Stage II: Advanced Projects and Geographic Coverage

90. Beginning in 1974, the SU movement increased the scale of its agricultural production infrastructure projects from individual village-level projects to inter-village *Saemaul* zones. At the same time, it upgraded SU village income-generating projects to agribusinesses and cottage industry facilities referred to as *Saemaul* factories.

Advanced Agricultural Production Infrastructure

91. During Stage II, the SU movement linked large-scale government projects such as construction of reservoirs and water pumping facilities to intervillage *Saemaul*-zone projects. These projects advanced the state of agricultural production infrastructure in the Republic of Korea by constructing farm roads, aligning rice fields, renovating entire towns, balancing stream-fed water sources, forest preservation, stream bed embankment construction, and forestation. Such projects encouraged cooperation among neighboring villages and improvement of the village environment overall. Construction of straight, broad farm roads, for example, not only paved the way for the introduction of mechanized farming, but also facilitated transport on a regional basis.

92. **Farm road construction.** In rural areas, traditional farm walkways were too narrow and meandering to allow the use of motor vehicles or animal carts for carrying agricultural products. Improving agricultural output by facilitating transport required that walkways be both wider and longer. In 1976, 64.7 km of new farm roads were built under 37 projects implemented through intervillage cooperation, 5.1 km of these being paved in 1977. In 1978, a total of 33 new construction projects built an additional 47.9 km of farm roads.

93. Under the SU movement, the government designated all rural roads more than 5 meters wide as "farm roads," since a minimum width of 5.4 m with a 1-m shoulder is required for use by motor vehicles

and animal carts. For two motor vehicles to operate side by side, a 7-m width is required together with 1-m-wide shoulders on both sides of the road, whereas accommodating two animal carts side by side required only a 3.8-m width including shoulders on both sides. However, only those farm roads constructed for general use were paved.

94. Farm roads were built to the following specifications:

- (i) To ensure correct drainage, farm roads were built higher than the shoulders that bordered them and included gutters. If a road crossed a stream, a drainpipe was installed under it.
- (ii) To ensure that farm roads would not flood during heavy rain, less-permeable clay and earth mixed with grass were avoided as construction materials. Instead, sandy soil was used due to its superior drainage characteristics, and the road surface was paved with 3–10 cm of gravel.
- (iii) Grass was planted on the slopes near roads to protect them from landslides.

95. **Farmland alignment.** Rice field alignment projects implemented by the government were generally unsuccessful during the 1960s due to the fact that agricultural water supply systems were incomplete in most rural areas. However, during Stage II of the SU movement, the government increased its budget for rice field alignment from W11.36 billion in Stage I to W30.75 billion in Stage II. That said, in Stage II, W61.28 billion—an amount more than double that budgeted for Stage II—was invested in rice field alignment. The total area targeted for alignment was 588,000 ha, or 44.8% of the total of 1.312 million ha of rice fields in all of the Republic of Korea. By the end of 1979, 322,000 ha, or 54.8% of the targeted rice field area, had been aligned to allow introduction of mechanized rice farming.

96. The major purpose of farmland alignment is to intensify land use for the purpose of increasing per-hectare yields. SU rice field alignment projects enlarged the average size of rice paddies, thus improving productivity by allowing economies of scale to be reaped through mechanization, the latter likewise decreasing labor costs.

Box 7: Farm Road Construction with Local Government Support

Nam Yuldong village, Sejok-myon, Chilgok-gun, North Gyeongsang Province

In January 1973, the villagers decided on a farm road building project at the village general meeting. When they began the earthwork, the county office announced that the local government would provide financial support to the project. As a result, the *Saemaul* leaders formulated a detailed action plan that specified a timetable for the works, the mechanisms to be used for transferring land ownership to the village, mobilization of labor, preparation of construction materials, and the period of time required for design. After discussion with engineers from the county office, a 2-km farm road was planned. The road would include 600 m of gutters, one overpass, and two culverts. The county office provided financial support of W1,205,000 (\$3,000) and the village provided the labor and secured the transfer of land necessary for the roadway.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 8: Farmland Alignment

Ipsok village, Gagum-myon, Chungwon-gun, North Chungcheong province

During the SU movement's Stage I, Ipsok villagers constructed a 1.5-km farm road and two overpasses, replaced the thatched roofs of 66 houses with tile and slate, and broadened all of the village paths. In August 1972, monsoon floods damaged 80% of the village's farmland and roads. Under *Saemaul* leadership, the villagers rebuilt their farmland and roads with government financial support. During Stage II, Ipsok villagers aligned their farmland into a 15-ha high-yield rice production complex. In 1975, Ipsok villagers' household income averaged W1.4 million as a result of farmland alignment and introduction of mechanized agriculture.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

97. **Mechanized farming.** Rapid rural–urban migration due to industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s caused agricultural wages to rise. As a result, during Stage I of the SU movement, simple farm machines such as motor vehicles, mechanized pumps, and sprayers were first introduced. Then in Stage II, more complex farm machines such as sowers and transplanting machines, tractors, combines, and dryers came into use. The number of motorized vehicles on farms increased from 56,007 in Stage I to 212,469 in Stage II. In 1979, the final year of Stage III, the rural villagers owned a total of 628,724 motorized vehicles, or an average of 20 vehicles per village.

98. Given that two-thirds of the country's farm households owned less than 1 ha of farmland each during the early 1970s, reaping economies of scale in production required that the costs of mechanized farming be shared by a number of households. As a result, only 10% of farmers owned farm machines, but 50% of them rented them. Sharing of farm machines was thus popular by the end of Stage III, particularly in the case of machines only required for short periods, such as transplanting machines, combines, and dryers.

Household Income Generation

99. Stage II household income-generation projects tended to be of a more sophisticated and complex nature than those implemented during Stage I. Stage II income-generating projects thus included agribusiness, collective farm estates on which production of specialized agricultural items was possible through systematized production, processing, and distribution. Nonagricultural cottage-industry

projects including *Saemaul* factories were implemented as a means of boosting rural employment during winter.

100. **Collective farm estates.** From 1972 to 1976, the government formed 135 collective farm estates at a cost of W87.9 billion. A total of 750,000 rural households worked on these estates, which produced 29 specialty agricultural items. These included citrus produced on Jeju Island, peanuts produced in Yesan in the country's southwestern region, hops grown in Pyongchang in the north-central region, mushrooms (*agaricus bisporus*) grown in North Gyeongsang province, and oysters farmed in Seocheon, South Chungcheong province. By the end of 1977, the annual average income of participants was W1,574,000, or 9.8% higher than the annual average income of W1,433,000 earned by nonparticipants.

101. Some of the specialty agricultural items produced by these estates, including citrus, oyster, and mushrooms, were exported, with remarkable growth rates in exports of citrus (1,800%) and mushrooms (1,000%) during 1972–1976. Such impressive rates of growth boosted the total value of exports of agricultural products to \$328 million in 1971, a 255% increase over 1967.

102. **Saemaul factories.** One of the goals of the SU rural income-generation projects was to maximize employment during the agricultural off-season, in particular by constructing *Saemaul* factories. During Stage I, these factories produced craft items requiring only simple technology, such as weaving of straw rope or bags, or fabrication of simple bamboo products. However, during Stage II, the SU

Box 9: Collective Farm Estates

Habangtan-ri village, Daeheung-myon, Yesan-gun, South Chungcheong Province

After successfully increasing rice production during Stage I of the SU movement, Habangtan-ri villagers used the proceeds of a loan of W1.2 million from the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation to form a collective estate for producing peanuts on deserted land located in the upper reaches of the local reservoir. This land had previously been deemed to have no alternative use since 14.84 hectares had flooded during the 1974 monsoon season. During the first year of peanut production, most of the land was flooded just prior to the harvest, as the monsoon rains came unusually early. As a result, poplar trees—which grow in water—were planted on 4.95 ha of land that had flooded that year. During the following harvest, the villages earned W30 million from peanuts produced on 9.9 ha of land that had never flooded.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

movement intensified its “one *Saemaul* factory per village” campaign that it had begun in 1973. While the government recognized 689 *Saemaul* factories during the period 1973–1979, by the end of 1979, 492 factories, or 71.4% of those recognized by the government, produced goods valued at W426.3 billion, with the value of goods produced for export totaling \$494 million.

103. *Saemaul* factories increased rural household incomes not only by employing rural labor during the agricultural off-season, but also through restructuring of regional industries and creation of new agribusiness enterprises. As a result, the number of employees at *Saemaul* factories increased 3.9 times, from 17,000 persons in 1973 to 67,900 in 1979. Total paid wages thus increased 55.1 times from W1.212 billion in 1973 to W66.795 billion. Similarly, the value of materials supplied from rural households increased from W0.242 billion in 1973 to W4.243 billion in 1979.

104. The above notwithstanding, the SU movement’s “one *Saemaul* factory per village” campaign failed to achieve its target of 1,471 factories. By the end of 1979, 689 factories, or 46.8% of the targeted number, had been completed, and only 492, or 33.4% of the targeted number, were operating. As *Saemaul* factories were upgraded over time to produce increasingly technology-intensive products, expansion of output was constrained by lack of availability of specialized labor, as most employees were by definition drawn from rural villages.

Geographical Coverage

105. **Open-field villages.** While the SU mechanized farming project targeted open-field villages, only 8,104 of the country’s 34,965 villages were categorized as such. As a result, under this project the SU movement completed farmland alignment, installed farming machine centers, and built processing facilities.

Box 10: Increasing Household Income by Establishing a *Saemaul* Factory

Sutaek 1-ri village, Guri-eup, Yangju-gun, Gyeonggi Province

At a village general meeting in 1976, Mr. Lee Wan Sok, the *Saemaul* leader of Sutaek 1-ri village, suggested that the village should establish a *Saemaul* factory in order to increase the average household income of villagers. The estimated cost of setting up the factory totaled W7.5 million, including W4.5 million to be paid as wages to villagers for extracting the sand necessary for construction as well as labor for building the factory. W2.0 million of this amount was to be provided from donations. The Sutaek village *Saemaul* factory produced ingredients for food products made by a separate food processing plant. An average of 40 villagers earning W2.4 million in monthly wages were employed by the factory. In 1977, the village added an additional *Saemaul* factory that produced spun goods at a cost of W4.0 million. The government provided W1.5 million of this amount, with W2.5 million of the total being financed from the village fund. Seventy persons earning a total of W4.2 million in monthly income were employed by these two factories. In addition, the village earned an additional W8.0 million annually from swine and poultry husbandry, the animals in part being fed dregs from the *Saemaul* factory that produced food ingredients.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 11: *Saemaul Undong* Projects in a Typical Open-Field Village

Gumsan-2 ri village, Seongsan-myon, Myongju-gun, Gangwon Province

In 1973, Gumsan-2 ri, the open-field village near Gangneung city, began a farmland alignment project by constructing a 200-m, 5-m-wide village entrance road and broadening 120 m of village paths. In 1975, the villagers likewise used volunteer students and soldiers to align 56 ha of farmland to enable mechanized farming. This allowed mechanized farming to begin in 1976.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

106. **Hillside villages.** SU farming projects, such as husbandry of *hanwu* (*wagyu*, or high-quality beef cattle) and swine; cultivation of herbal medicines, tobacco, and chili; and cultivation of trees for firewood were implemented in the country's 18,995 hillside villages, the category of villages containing the largest total number of settlements.

107. **Mountain villages.** In the 1,953 villages that made up the mountain village group, SU projects included large-scale cultivation of nut trees and trees for lumber, as well as highland vegetable plantations.

108. **Fishing villages.** This category of villages comprised only 1,583 settlements. SU projects implemented in these villages focused on basic infrastructure for fishing such as construction of

piers and embankments and modernization of fishing equipment, as well as infrastructure for farming of fish, seaweed, and oysters.

109. **Suburban villages.** A total of 4,330 settlements made up the suburban village category. SU projects implemented in these villages include cultivation of flowers, fruit, and vegetables, as well as associated cottage industries.

Stage III: Urban Saemaul Undong Movement

110. During Stage III of the SU movement, members of society who embraced the principles that led to the SU movement's success in both the medium

Box 12: Hanwu Husbandry in a Hillside Village

Gosan-ri village, Jinwon-myon, Jangseong-gun, South Jolla Province

In 1971, Gosan-ri village joined the SU movement by building an 8-km farm road on land donated by the villagers themselves, with the government providing the cement required for the project. Subsequently, the villagers implemented a series of income-generating projects. Households located on the mountainside chose *hanwu* husbandry or production of tree nuts, while others cultivated medicinal herbs. By 1972, the *hanwu* beef cattle herd totaled 68 animals, the chestnut tree plantation included 2,000 trees, and a 0.2 ha field for cultivating peony was in operation.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 13: Highland Vegetable Cultivation in a Mountain Village

Jungheulli village, Ganseong-myon, Goseong-gun, Gangwon Province

Jungheulli, located at an elevation of 700–800 m, is a typical mountain village in the Republic of Korea. In 1972, 36 of the village's 38 households succeeded in cultivating burdock, an herbal medicine, in a 50-ha field high on a mountain slope. All of the herbs cultivated in the village were exported to Japan, which earned a total annual income for the village of W2 million.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 14: Oyster Processing in a Fishing Village

Inpyong 2-dong, Chungmu-si, South Gyeongsang Province

In 1972, young residents of Inpyong 2-dong village built an oyster processing factory. The total cost of constructing the factory was W4 million, W2 million of which was provided under government subsidy. A W2 million loan from the National Fishery Cooperative Federation provided the remaining funds required for the project. While oyster farming had begun in the late 1960s, this village now boasts a *Saemaul* factory that processes oysters.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

and long term was broadened to include urban area residents, academics, professionals, members of the clergy, high-ranking government officials, and professionals. While during the mid-1970s the urban population composed 52% of the nation's total population, by the late 1970s this had grown to 70%, with urban-based industry contributing more than 80% of gross national product. As a result, disseminating the beneficial effects of the SU movement to the population at large required expanding the movement to include all urban residents.

111. Two phenomena provided the impetus for expanding the SU movement into urban areas. The first of these was the series of oil shocks that occurred over the period 1973–1978. The second was that members of the urban elite from both the public and private sectors had begun participating in the educational programs offered at the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders. This required that the urban SU movement, which was initially modeled after the rural experiences, be adapted to the urban setting while continuing to promote the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) as character traits desirable for well-educated members of the urban elite. In addition to modifying some facets of the SU movement to make them relevant to the urban setting, the government designated the first day of each month as “*Saemaul Day*” in urban communities as a means of promoting the SU movement one day per month in urban neighborhoods, offices, and schools.

Industrial *Saemaul Undong* Movement

112. Because of the inherent petroleum-scarce nature of natural resource endowment of the Republic of Korea, the first oil shock of October 1973 impacted the country heavily. Further, at this time the Republic of Korea was a newly industrializing country. Thus, the rapid increase in the price of petroleum that occurred during the oil shock hiked the price not only of energy and petroleum-based raw materials, but also the prices of consumer goods. While these rapid increases in the price of petroleum-based raw materials raised production costs, the parallel increases in the price of consumer goods depressed demand, thereby increasing unemployment and decreasing the country's rate of GDP growth. As a result, the Republic of Korea faced an imminent threat of its economy going into depression. That said, during the oil

shocks of the 1970s, the country benefited greatly from the intangible benefits of the SU movement, in that industrial labor and management alike collaborated in a way that improved productivity by means of reducing energy costs and savings in material. In short, widespread acceptance of the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) helped to minimize the negative impact of the oil shocks of the 1970s, as well as the economic crises that these shocks spawned at the nation's industrial sites.

113. In response to the above events, the industrial arm of the SU movement began educating both blue- and white-collar workers in the *Saemaul* spirit, both at the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders and at *Saemaul* training institutes set up within the nation's industrial sites. The nature of the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit greatly facilitated cooperation between labor and management, and also led to increases in productivity that made industrial production more efficient. Finally, implementation of the *Saemaul* spirit under the negative impact of the oil shocks of the 1970s meant that welfare programs were set up for labor displaced by the economic downturn that naturally followed in the wake of rapid increases in the price of petroleum.

114. **Labor–management cooperation.** As far as labor–management cooperation during the 1970s was concerned, the authoritarian Park Chung Hee government strictly prohibited organization of trade unions at the nation's industrial sites. During the 1970s, most products in labor-intensive industries were internationally competitive in global markets due to the country's relatively low wage rates, which the Park Chung Hee administration was eager to maintain. In this regard, the industrial SU movement served the government's ends by diffusing worker discontent arising from relatively low wage rates through persistent emphasis on the cooperation component of the *Saemaul* spirit. The cooperation aspect of the *Saemaul* spirit likewise diffused labor discontent because it encouraged management to maintain intimate personal relations with labor. This in turn made labor far more willing to participate in quality control programs that contained costs, which maintained the country's competitiveness in the global market for industrial goods. Thus, the industrial SU movement helped to successfully block labor–management conflict and organization

of trade unions, thereby helping the industry sector to maintain international competitiveness.

115. **Productivity and welfare programs.** The cooperation component of the *Saemaul* spirit continually stressed by the industrial SU movement helped to drive productivity campaigns and welfare programs for workers through voluntary labor-management cooperation. Increases in productivity in turn allowed wage increases to be granted, even in the difficult politico-economic context of the 1970s. Through a series of lectures and group discussions, the industrial SU movement thus educated workers in the importance of achieving productivity increases. Given a relative lack of technology and machinery, the productivity increases at the time focused on quality control and improvement, reductions in the use of material, energy savings, and efficient management of productive processes.

116. In parallel with the emphasis on productivity, the SU movement developed a number of welfare programs that encouraged workers who operated in a difficult employment environment. Fringe benefits including bonuses and allowances were increased, and various facilities for improving the quality of life at work were constructed at industrial sites. These included dormitories, dining rooms, lounges, and bathrooms. The SU movement likewise encouraged young workers to continue their middle- and high-school educations through night classes taught at the industrial sites and courses taught over radio. As a result, the industrial SU movement increased productivity nationally, which allowed industrial enterprises to grant workers real income increases and

improvement in their overall welfare. In turn, these benefits motivated workers to boost productivity. This virtuous circle of productivity–wage increase–welfare improvement was thus maintained throughout the years in which the industrial SU movement was active.

117. As a result of the increases in productivity referred to in Box 15, the company's workers enjoyed an annual average wage increase of 40% and an average annual increase in fringe benefits of 228%. Moreover, the company was able to subsidize 50% of the cost of tuition for educating the employees' children.

Urban–Community *Saemaul Undong* Movement

118. **Change in mentality.** Members of the urban elite educated at the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders initiated the SU campaign of frugality, social cleansing, and settlement in their families, neighborhoods, offices, and schools. The urban SU movement targeted a change in people's mentality that would build a civic society in a modernizing urban environment based on rapid industrialization. Achieving this goal required that the stereotypical mentality of selfishness and disorderliness had to be reformed into altruism or individualism coupled with responsibility and public morality under the rule of law. In order to accomplish this, the urban SU movement promulgated the three components of the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) as a means of building a modern way of urban life.

Box 15: Success of the Industrial *Saemaul Undong* Movement

Taeyang Metal Co. in Pungnap-dong, Gangdong-gu, Seoul

Taeyang Metal Co. had produced bicycle parts and screws since 1954. In 1971 and 1973, Korean Standard (KS) mark permits on bicycle parts and screws were issued by the government. Then in 1977, the company was designated by the government as an industrial SU movement model site. By 1979, 17,000 metric tons of 12,000 different types of parts were produced by the site's 1,400 employees, exports of these products being valued at \$1.4 million.

Beginning in 1974, 118 groups of employees were educated at the company's *Saemaul* training center. As a result of the series of group discussions conducted by the *Saemaul* leader who was the plant's production manager, employees reduced the percentage share of disqualified products in total factory output from 14.7% in 1976, to 12.7% in 1977, to 8.7% in 1978, and finally to 5.3% in 1979. This saved energy and materials valued at W80 million in 1976, W180 million in 1977, W182 million in 1978, and W370 million in 1979. The 1978 agenda for production was discussed in groups in 1979.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

119. In 1978, the urban SU movement launched three orderliness campaigns:

- (i) *moral orderliness* (practice of the *Saemaul* spirit, neighborhood solidarity, creative application of traditional virtues, and community consciousness);
- (ii) *behavioral orderliness* (obeying traffic rules, engaging in honest transactions, behaving according to the rules of public morality, and being punctual); and
- (iii) *environmental orderliness* (cleaning and decorating of homes, business establishments, and side streets, and greening of the environment).

This movement was led by urban *Saemaul* leaders under their own initiative through local *Saemaul* councils and *Saemaul* women's councils. Moreover, both the media and schools promoted practicing the *Saemaul* spirit in public education circles.

120. **Families, neighborhoods, offices, and schools.** The rapid urbanization that followed in the wake of industrialization during the 1970s caused the population density in the Pusan and Seoul metropolitan areas to increase. This in turn changed people's living arrangements from single-family homes to collective housing in apartments or condominiums. These new urban dwelling patterns mitigated against the previous intimate nature of human relationships, mainly because the isolated and solitary nature of apartment living tended

to reduce social interaction. As a result, monthly meetings of the neighborhood unit, once a notorious legacy of mass mobilization during the period of colonial administration, was revived and transformed into a positive force by the urban SU movement in that it facilitated creation of relationships within neighborhoods.

121. In 1979, the urban SU movement promoted its *Saemaul* spirit campaign in offices in both the private and public sectors. By strengthening solidarity among colleagues, encouraging harmonious relations, promoting sound social morals as well as diligence and frugality, and sustaining neighborhood cooperation, the urban SU movement produced positive, though intangible, benefits that would continue to improve the quality of life for many generations.

122. Schools in the Republic of Korea were well-organized social organizations uniformly controlled by the government regardless of their ownership status. It was thus only natural for the government to insert the urban SU movement into its educational programs. Teachers and professors alike participated in compulsory camp trainings at the Training Institute for *Saemaul* Leaders beginning in 1974, and *Saemaul* education programs were introduced in the universities in 1976. In both elementary and secondary schools, the orderliness campaign programs of the SU movement were practiced, albeit in a manner that reflected the character of the *Saemaul* teacher concerned.

Impact on Individual and Community Well-Being

123. The SU movement positively impacted individual and community well-being, enriched the social capital of community members, and empowered civic society. For example, the *Saemaul* hall, which functioned as the village community hall, facilitated networking among villagers. *Sinbaram*, or enthusiastic participation in the SU movement, moved the rural population away from the mentality of government control over society. This is evident from the fact that the village general meeting was more powerful in making decisions regarding SU projects than was the village development committee, the membership of which included local government representatives. Moreover, *Saemaul* leaders could participate actively in the town and county levels of the *Saemaul* promotion council, in which influential regional leaders from both the public and private sectors participated. As a result of the SU movement, civil society originated in rural communities in the 1970s and following 1991, was strengthened by the revival of autonomous municipalities which were themselves an outgrowth of political democratization (S.I. Jun 2010).

124. In the 1970s, traditional Confucian folkways in the Republic of Korea dominated the view of society toward age and gender, these views often hampering innovative reform. In contrast, the SU movement revitalized rural communities by increasing the level of participation of all community members, thus moving them away from the old biases that demanded that deference be paid to males and more senior persons. As a result, women in the Republic of Korea today enjoy some of the most advanced gender policies in the world, these having been institutionalized at the onset of the SU movement. As female *Saemaul* leaders were elected as equal partners with male village leaders, the role of women in planning, decision making, executing, monitoring, and evaluating SU projects could only grow. Moreover, women's solidarity within village communities was strengthened through associations such as the *Saemaul* Wives' Club and Mothers' Club. In addition, women contributed to small-scale increases in household income through

sideline wage employment in *Saemaul* factories and through frugality campaigns (Reed 2010).

125. In this chapter, the impact of the SU movement on individual and community well-being is discussed in five dimensions:

- (i) household income increases, which liberated people from poverty;
- (ii) basic infrastructure and services, such as mechanized farming and electrification, which revolutionized the lives of rural villagers;
- (iii) amassing of social capital through the SU movement's emphasis on merit, and empowerment of communities through self-help and self-reliance;
- (iv) growth of civil society, which was achieved by the SU movement through its emphasis on communal revitalization through allowing young *Saemaul* leaders, and its abolition of the legacy of social status; and
- (v) gender liberation through increases in female political participation and transformation of women's new role in household management.

Income Increases and Poverty Reduction

126. The SU movement attempted to not only balance the income gap between rural and urban communities, but also to overcome absolute poverty within the Republic of Korea, as the nation's annual per capita income in 1971 was a scant \$286. The notion of the "barley hump" (a symbolic expression referring to subsisting entirely on barley during a food shortage) symbolically represented not only absolute poverty in rural villages, but also the poverty that was once endemic in urban shanty towns. In response to poverty of this type, one objective of the SU movement was to end barley humps in rural villages and to remove illegal shanty towns from metropolitan centers and their suburban communities.

127. Ultimately, absolute poverty can only be resolved through increases in household and individual income. Given that the SU movement pursued individual and communal well-being in rural communities in particular, projects for increasing individual and communal incomes were one of its essential features. This is apparent from the fact that 96% of SU movement investment went to rural communities, with 44% of this being used to fund income-generating projects. As a result, rural household income had increased remarkably by the end of the movement's Stage I. During the 3 years in which Stage II was implemented, as well as the first year of implementation of Stage III, average annual rural household income reached parity with its counterpart in urban areas (Table 2). In particular, the objective of introducing high-yielding rice varieties during Stage I was to end barley humps. As a result, the SU movement successfully solved the problem of absolute poverty through its income-generating projects.

Diversifying Income Sources

128. Rural household income-generating projects under the SU movement diversified sources of household income by transforming the country's

grain-production-driven rural economy into a commercialized farming economy by introducing agro-processing in rural communities. SU projects were successful in this regard in that average annual household income in rural communities increased from W360,000 in 1971 to W2,230,000 in 1979. Examples of such projects include promoting the production of high-income goods, mechanized farming, and rural village savings programs.

129. In response to chronic agricultural off-season unemployment in the nation's rural communities, wages paid during implementation of SU movement projects during 1974–1980 reached W226 billion, which contributed to decreasing the rural unemployment rate. In urban communities, the growing employment of factory workers helped to mitigate poverty.

Rural Public Financing and Urban Productivity

130. With the success of the SU movement's income-generating projects, a prominent cash flow appeared for the first time in rural communities. This is mirrored in the striking growth of town-level branches of the National Agricultural Cooperative

Table 2: Average Annual Household Income of Rural Farmers and Urban Laborers, 1970–1979
(thousands of won)

Year	Rural Farmers (A)		Urban Laborers (B)		Difference	
	Income per Household	Percent Increase	Income per Household	Percent Increase	A – B	A/B %
1970	255.8	28	381.2	39	(125.4)	67.1
1971	356.4	39	451.9	18	(95.5)	78.9
1972	429.4	20	517.4	14	(88.0)	83.0
1973	480.7	12	550.2	6	(69.5)	87.4
1974	674.5	40	644.5	17	30.0	104.6
1975	872.9	29	859.3	33	13.6	101.6
1976	1,156.3	32	1,151.8	34	4.5	100.4
1977	1,432.8	24	1,405.1	22	27.7	102.0
1978	1,884.2	32	1,916.3	36	(32.1)	98.3
1979	2,227.5	18	2,629.6	37	(–402.1)	84.7

Source: Economic Planning Board and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Federation and the National Fishery Cooperative Federation. By the end of the 1960s, the national agricultural banking organization no longer served farmers. However, during the 1970s, the Saemaul Bank (Village Bank), which was a microfinance institution, had replaced the notorious private banking system, which had charged rates of interest so high that indebtedness was a serious problem in the rural population. At urban industrial sites, the SU movement focused on increasing productivity in order to increase the household income of factory workers. Given that organization of a trade union was forbidden under the Park Chung Hee administration, the urban SU movement encouraged entrepreneurs to pay bonuses to workers whose productivity increased.

Access to Infrastructure and Services

131. SU movement projects transformed life in rural communities by introducing motor vehicles, mechanized farming, electricity, and residential telephone services. By 1978, 98% of the nation's rural villages had access to electricity, as compared with only 20% in 1970. During 1971–1980, 28% of SU funds were invested in welfare and environment improvement projects, a percentage share only second to income-generating projects.

Mechanized Farming

132. Prior to the SU movement, mechanized farming was unknown in the Republic of Korea because the nation's arable lands were primarily located in narrow valleys connected by small, meandering pathways. The wide, straight farm roads constructed under the SU movement and the rectangular alignment of farmlands that the movement introduced allowed use of mechanized farming equipment. Initially, only simple motor-powered cultivators were used. However, such basic machinery was soon replaced by sophisticated rice-transplanting and harvesting machines. The need for adoption of mechanized farming was inevitable as a result of the rapid rural–urban migration that resulted from quickly increasing urban wage levels during the 1960s and 1970s.

133. At the end of 1970, only 11,884 motor-powered cultivators were in use in the country. As a result of the SU movement, this increased to 16,842 in 1971

and then to 37,660 in 1973, which was the final year of the SU movement's Stage I. By 1976, which marked the end of Stage II, 122,079 motor-powered cultivators were in use, and by the end of Stage III in 1979, this had risen to 235,909 cultivators, or an average of 6.5 motor-powered cultivators per village. Motor-powered cultivators ultimately became the symbol of the SU movement.

134. The use of other farm machines such as weeding machines, motor-powered threshers, and water pumps likewise grew rapidly over the course of the SU movement. From 1970 to 1979, the number of weeding machines increased from 45,008 to 291,061, motored threshers from 41,038 to 203,081, and water pumps from 54,078 to 187,608.

135. The above notwithstanding, sophisticated farm machinery such as rice transplanting and harvesting machines was not introduced until 1973, at the end of Stage I. In 1973, only 6 transplanting machines and 25 harvesting machines were in use. By 1974, the number of such sophisticated farming machines was measured in double digits. In subsequent years these numbers quadrupled, ultimately reaching 2,416 transplanting machines and 12,535 harvesting machines in 1979, the final year of implementation of Stage III.

Electrification and Telecommunications

136. In the early 1970s, only 24.1% of the nation's homes had access to electricity and only 11.1% had telephones. Therefore, the most attractive incentives provided by the government to rural villagers under the SU movement were electrification and telephones. Villages with the best SU project performance were thus given priority access to electrification and telephone connections by the government.

137. During 1971–1977, government budgets were dominated by electrification projects targeting the country's 2,834,000 houses that lacked access to electricity. As a result, 2,777,500 houses, or 98% of the number targeted, had been electrified by 1979. During the final year of Stage III of the SU movement, most rural communities were enjoying refrigerators, washing machines, and black-and-white television sets.

138. Prior to the early 1980s, when automated telephone systems were introduced, telecommunication between provinces was provided by local

telephone services. By the end of 1970, 756 towns, or 56.9% of the nation's total of 1,328 towns, still lacked local telephone switching systems, whereas by the end of Stage II, all towns had access to such systems. Thus, by the end of 1978, 24,761 villages, or 68.2% of the nation's 36,313 total villages, had access to telephones.

Upgrading of Housing

139. Replacing thatched roofs with tin, tile, or slate coverings was so popular that it became the hallmark of the SU movement during Stage I. As a result, projects focusing on upgrading of housing implemented during Stages II and III resulted in improved quality of life in rural villages. As of 1975, there were 500,000 outmoded rural houses, or 18% of the nation's 2.925 million homes. However, during 1976–1979, most homes were remodeled under SU housing improvement projects (Table 3). Such improvements contributed to community well-being overall, provided encouragement to villagers, and stimulated construction-related businesses through standardized architectural designs.

Health Services

140. As most rural villages lacked medical clinics, the SU movement's mobile clinic project decreased morbidity from epidemics from 96.6 persons per 100,000 in 1970 to 26.2 persons per 100,000 in 1978 as a result of mass vaccination and widespread access to medical treatment. The number of patients cared for by medical services in Stage III (1977–1979) was 386,485 persons, including 55,164

hospitalized patients and 331,321 treated by outpatient services.

141. Tuberculosis resulting from malnutrition was endemic in the Republic of Korea prior to the 1970s. That said, vaccination against tuberculosis carried out under the SU movement increased the size of the country's immune population. In all, 9.6 million persons were vaccinated against tuberculosis during Stages I, II, and III of the SU movement.

142. The SU medical insurance project was first introduced to low-income rural population in January 1977. During Stage III, government investment of W26,522 million allowed 25.1 million persons to be covered by medical insurance (Table 4).

Farming-Season Nurseries

143. During the farming season, the workload of women increased by more than 2 hours per day because of the additional work they did in the fields. In response, the SU movement set up farming-season nurseries to help working women with child care. Volunteer nurses operated the nurseries twice a year for 30 days. During 1971–1979, 57,199 nurseries cared for 1.8 million children under the age of 5. According to a 1979 survey, the average height and weight of 6-year-olds in rural regions was 107.5 cm and 17.5 kilograms (kg), and in urban regions 107.3 cm and 18.4 kg. Because of the SU nurseries, the physical development of rural children had thus improved relative to urban children in that they were slightly taller on average but weighed slightly less (Ministry of Home Affairs 1980).

Table 3: Saemaul Undong Housing Improvement Projects
(houses, millions of won)

Year	Number of Houses			Project Budget			
	Total	Subsidized	Self-Financed	Total	Loan Funding	Subsidy	Self-Financing
Total	185,782 (100%)	104,492 (56%)	89,290 (44%)	262,727	189,660	12,676	60,391
1976	4,254	4,254	00	5,104	2,552	638	1,914
1977	2,991	15,238	27,753	23,802	7,251	3,038	13,513
1978	74,366	50,000	24,366	108,750	83,000	–	20,750
1979	64,171	35,000	29,171	125,071	96,857	384,000	24,214

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs.

Communal Empowerment

144. Park Chung Hee's idea of introducing competition among rural villages under the early SU movement has been interpreted by a sociologist in terms of social capital theory (S.I. Jun 2010). The rationale behind this was that the government should support the villages that amassed social capital to the greatest degree, as measured by intensification of the desirable qualities of leadership, cooperation, trust, and community spirit. The SU movement thus stimulated the formation of social capital in both rural and urban communities. In the case of the Republic of Korea, social capital formation was more dynamic in terms of leadership and cooperation derived from *sinbaram* (excitement with pleasure) than conventional social capital formation, the foundation of which is trust, networking, and social norms.

145. Civil society theory also informs analysis of the SU movement. While the movement was initiated by the government through planning and financial support, the principal actors were the villagers and urban community members themselves. The SU movement taught them new roles as political actors, even to the extent of influencing politicians (S.I. Jun 2010).

Social Capital Formation

146. Prior to the SU movement, most organizations in rural and urban communities were imposed by the government or entities outside the local community. What was noteworthy about the SU movement was its voluntary participation aspect, especially by women. Construction of *Saemaul* halls (village community halls), built by consensus of the villagers themselves, illustrates the self-help spirit of social capital formation that arose under the SU movement. During 1972–1980, 37,012 community halls were built in the Republic of Korea, which translates into nearly one community hall per village (Table 5).

147. The three components of the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) spread rapidly as a result of *sinbaram* social capital formation rather than imposition by the government, even though the government provided financial and other support to the movement. *Sinbaram* may thus be defined as the style of social capital formation in the Republic of Korea, which is done through volunteerism as opposed to the Western style of social capital formation that results from trust, networks, and social norms. In the case of the Republic of Korea, social

Table 4: Medical Insurance Coverage under Stage III of the Saemaul Undong Movement

Year	Persons Insured (thousands)	Government Investment (millions of won)		
		Total	National	Local
Total	25,101	26,522	19,892	6,630
1977	4,693	4,982	3,737	1,245
1978	7,882	7,410	5,558	1,852
1979	8,274	8,775	6,581	2,194

Source: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

**Table 5: Construction of Community Halls, 1972–1980
(number of halls)**

Year Total	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
37,012	4,452	14,761	1,545	2,694	3,305	3,518	3,162	2,513	1,062

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs.

capital formation under the SU movement propelled modernization in both rural and urban communities.

Growth of Civil Society

148. Voluntary participation by members of rural communities was the hallmark of the SU movement. One of the reasons for the popularity of this aspect of the SU movement was that it replaced former acceptance of the power of government over people with empowerment of the people. The growth of civil society in the Republic of Korea contrasts sharply with that in European communities in that it first occurred in rural areas and then spread to urban locales, and was initially propelled not by the urban bourgeoisie, but instead by members of rural communities.

Community Revitalization

149. During the 1970s, the traditional Confucian order that prevailed in most communities in the Republic of Korea often interfered with innovation and reform. Thus, the reform-oriented SU movement in its early stage was often in conflict with such traditions, particularly in conservative rural villages. In its efforts to bring about social change, the SU movement could not help but move people away from the biases of traditional ways. Thus, the deference to those more senior than oneself embedded in the Confucian legacy had to be reconsidered by the community at large when young *Saemaul* leaders were elected by popular vote at village general meetings.

150. Similarly, the Confucian tenet of being obliged to take one's proper place in a social hierarchy could only hamper cooperation among community members. It thus likewise had to be challenged under the SU movement. Such sweeping social changes produced by the SU movement acted to automatically sweep away other biases inherent in the traditional Confucian view of society.

Leadership by the Younger Generation

151. The SU movement installed a cohort of young, educated, and development-oriented *Saemaul* leaders who were directly elected by vote at village general meetings. This invigorated traditional rural communities with new knowledge and technology obtained from the education of these younger leaders, as well as the management expertise they

derived from their military careers. These aspects of the new young leadership likewise made them capable of persuading village chiefs and elders. For their part, the existing older village chiefs and elders played an important role in that their experience complemented the vigor of the younger leadership with dispute-resolution and negotiating skills.

152. Similarly, the leadership training program for *Saemaul* leaders contributed to revitalization of local communities in that these young leaders were able to clearly articulate the objectives and intentions of the SU movement to villagers. During their training camps, *Saemaul* leaders shared their experiences of community revitalization in both rural and urban communities.

Status-Free Village Life

153. Despite the rapid industrialization and urbanization that occurred in the Republic of Korea in the early 1970s, discrimination by one's status remained persistent in many traditional rural communities. This was particularly true of single-lineage villages, since the traditional Confucian order distinguished between various types of status, the *yangban literati*, or ruling status, being particularly distinguished from other types of status including that of commoners. Because the 1949 land reform (see para 185) abolished political and socioeconomic discrimination, the scale of discrimination shrank to that relating to cultural rituals such as marriage, mourning ceremonies, and ancestor worship. Such cultural discrimination to a significant degree maintained a psychological schism in community life between the privileged and underprivileged.

154. With the introduction of village general meetings—a village-level democratic legislative organization—villagers became equal in terms of social status under the SU movement. All SU projects required labor contributions of one type or another by all villagers, regardless of social status. As a result, the SU movement contributed significantly to revitalization of rural communities by ending discrimination by status.

Changes in the Role of Women

155. Bound by the Confucian patriarchal tradition of giving priority to males, the family roles of women

in the Republic of Korea had been limited to that of mothers, daughters-in-law, and daughters until the SU movement encouraged them to participate in community activities. Given the traditional role of women in family life, the *Saemaul* spirit values of diligence and self-help were not new to women. However, the SU movement taught them cooperation, the third component of the *Saemaul* spirit, and encouraged them to participate in community organizations such as the *Saemaul* Women's Club or Mothers' Club.

156. The SU movement called on women to fulfill new social roles as community members that extended beyond their traditional roles within the family. As a result, women were quickly liberated from their traditional family roles and participated in community activities. Such dramatic changes in traditional gender roles in the Republic of Korea would have been impossible in the absence of the SU movement.

Women's Social Participation

157. This shift in the role of women induced by the SU movement began with their election as *Saemaul* leaders on an equal footing with men, even though male and female leaders were assigned different roles. In rural communities, female *Saemaul* leaders actively participated in village decision making in the selection and implementation of projects through their participation at village general meetings. In the urban SU movement, the active participants in neighborhood organizations were for the most part housewives.

158. The *Saemaul* Women's Club played a key role in many villages in that it raised funds for community projects, increased savings for the communal fund, and managed community assets through the *Saemaul* village banks. In urban communities, housewives led neighborhood projects such as cleaning back streets and alleys.

Women's Household Management

159. With the guidance and support of the government, the SU movement encouraged women in rural communities to initiate small-scale income-generating projects for their households. These women promoted abstinence from alcohol and smoking and adopted frugality programs in their family lives in order to save money and increase household income. Many earned wages by working in *Saemaul* factories, generated side income from small-scale animal husbandry, or saved money in numerous ways, such as avoiding lavish ancestral ceremonies.

160. Compared with rural villages, the changes in the role of women related primarily to changes in the scope of household activities. Urban housewives actively led the SU movement's frugality campaign by promoting savings of electricity, tap water, and paper, and reducing the use of telephones, automobiles, and alcoholic beverages. Moreover, they participated aggressively in projects that increased household income through earnings from part-time work. Under the SU movement, most urban households kept records of daily expenses and opened at least one bank account for the purpose of accumulating savings.

The *Saemaul Undong* Movement's Participatory Approach to Development

161. In terms of a participatory approach to development, the SU movement benefited from failed government programs in the 1960s, such as the National Movement for Reconstruction (1961–1964) and Special Projects for Rural Household Income Increases (1968–1970), which relied on compulsory participation. The SU movement in the 1970s, however, could encourage voluntary participation by awakening in the rural population the *Saemaul* spirit of diligence, self-help, and cooperation.

162. This aspect of the SU movement was in some ways its greatest strength. In 1970, the movement successfully achieved the participation of most rural villagers simply by offering a subsidy of 335 bags of cement and 0.5 tons of iron rods to each of 33,267 villages. Participation by villagers became almost immediately apparent through organization of village general meetings and election of *Saemaul* leaders of both genders for the purpose of implementing SU projects. News of nationwide SU campaigns disseminated by broadcast, print, and film media accelerated voluntary participation of the community members.

163. In this chapter, the strengths and weaknesses of the participatory aspect of the SU movement are discussed. As for its strengths, three institutional arrangements (government-community coordination, participation by women, and the *Saemaul* education system) are discussed, as are three bottlenecks (the traditional legacy of the Republic of Korea, the age composition of the labor force, and antigovernment criticism).

Institutional Arrangements for Participation

164. Five factors shaped the SU movement's participatory approach to development:

- (i) the authoritarian rule of the Park Chung Hee administration,
- (ii) changes in the size and composition of the rural population due to rapid urbanization,
- (iii) rural community enlightenment that resulted from higher education,
- (iv) the expanded role of women in rural communities, and
- (v) the impact of *Saemaul* education on the urban elite and on rural *Saemaul* leaders.

Government–Community Coordination

165. The centralized nature of government administration under the authoritarian Yusin regime in the early 1970s facilitated coordination of government agencies and local community organizations through the *Saemaul* promotional councils that were active at every level of local government. Within this context, the voluntary aspect of the SU movement appealed to the rural population, particularly because of its strong interest in participation (Reed 2010).

166. In the early stages of the movement, local administrative officers at the *myon* (town) and *gun* (county) levels played an important role in planning and executing SU projects. The primary contact the government had with villagers was through officers of the local *myon* or *gun*. These officers advised and consulted with villagers, particularly the *Saemaul* leaders, on matters relating to administrative guidance and technology. These local administrative officials likewise actively participated in meetings of the *Saemaul* promotional councils at the town and county levels.

167. The vision of rural modernization sought by the SU movement generally appealed to the rural population who desired a better life. Given that rural communities experienced collaboration in

agricultural fieldwork and mutual funding through *kye*, or the traditional village assembly, SU institutional arrangements such as the village general meeting and the village development committee were familiar structures to them.

Women's Organizations

168. With changes in the composition of the labor force in rural communities brought about by rapid rural–urban migration, participation by rural women in the SU movement increased in spite of initial cynicism from tradition-oriented villagers. Village women's organizations such as the Mother's Club—which were not suddenly born, but had already existed in many rural communities—contributed to villagers' participation in the SU movement. The most active participation occurred in villages in which a gender-neutral ambience prevailed in the implementation of SU projects.

169. The elected female *Saemaul* leaders in rural communities contributed greatly to participation in the SU movement by increasing the participation by women, prodding reluctant men to join it, advocating village fund-raising, providing their labor to village projects, criticizing the decadence of men, improving lifestyles, campaigning for literacy,

inspiring the *Saemaul* spirit character trait of cooperation, and campaigning for rural households to undertake savings programs.

170. Most active female *Saemaul* leaders shared the following characteristics: they were approximately 30 years old, they had received formal education of more than 9 years at modern educational institutes, and they were spouses of male *Saemaul* leaders. *Saemaul* leader couples were often able to persuade villagers to participate in the movement against the biases common to the old generation. For example, in Yaksu Village, a conservative settlement in Ulju-gun, South Gyeongsang Province, the female *Saemaul* leader invited village elders to act as advisers of the women's organization in order to get their consent.

171. Given traditional gender discrimination within families, women often sacrificed their opportunity for higher education to allow their brothers to attend college. However, within the context of the SU movement, women's innovative ways of thinking quickly changed conventional male-oriented notions of correct behavior. In many cases, female *Saemaul* leaders advanced more practical ideas than did men, such as simplifying mourning costumes, using bank notes, and upgrading kitchens for purposes of home economy and efficiency. Habits such as gambling, drinking

Box 16: Women's Organizations in the *Saemaul Undong* Movement

Twenty-two members of the Mothers' Club in Unsu 1-ri Village, Sudong-myon, Yangju-gun, Gyeonggi Province, raised club funds by saving rice, collecting wild vegetables, and working as wage laborers on forestation projects in order to build a bridge in the village. They gained support for their initiative when their spouses became frustrated with the project's funding shortage. Encouraged by the Mothers' Club, the villagers completed the 60-m-long, 4-m-wide bridge. It was the members of the Mothers' Club who provided labor for construction of the bridge, including handling sand and gravel.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Box 17: A Kitchen Modernization *Kye*

Thirty members of the Wives' Club in Chigok Village, Yangsan-gun, South Gyeongsang Province organized a *Saemaul kye* (traditional rural microfinance club) for improving kitchen equipment. Every month they collected W1,000 per member for a total of W30,000. These funds were used solely for improving the kitchen in the household of one of their members. After 30 months, all members enjoyed an upgraded kitchen. The kitchen *kye* of the Wives' Club in Chigok was an SU spin-off of participation in traditional men's *kye*, which raised funding for marriage and funeral ceremonies and for social gatherings.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

alcohol, and smoking that were common among men in rural communities were often targeted for abolishment by women's organizations.

Saemaul Education System

172. As the SU movement expanded its scope of public education through media and training camp courses, national participation increased substantially. The *Saemaul* training camps impressed most participants to the point of becoming ardent advocates of the SU movement.

173. The *Saemaul* leaders who participated in training camp courses in 1972 at the Training Institute for Independent Farmers (later referred to as the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders) hoped to expand the scope of education of participants to include local government heads and town and county mayors, all of whom engaged in the SU movement through face-to-face contacts with villagers. The training camps with *Saemaul* leaders from the villages impressed not only the local government heads, but also high-ranking central government officials. Thereafter, the government encouraged members of the urban social elite such as *chaebol* (large industrial conglomerate group) executives, entrepreneurs and owners of small- and medium-sized businesses, university professors, student leaders, medical doctors, and lawyers to participate in *Saemaul* training. In this manner, the SU movement used its training camp courses to expand its coverage nationally.

Bottlenecks to Participation

174. Under the authoritarian Park Chung Hee government, the multilayered government systems that supported the SU movement had adopted a top-down, centralized, command-and-control type of local administration. Five rungs existed in the government administrative ladder, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, the provinces, the counties, the towns, and the villages. This structure often delayed and sometimes deterred rapid decision making regarding SU activities. Moreover, the administrative structure of the *Saemaul* promotional councils mirrored that of the government, which sometimes resulted in redundancy. This top-down, command-and-control style of administration often discouraged villagers from participating and prevented creative ideas from being incorporated into SU movement activities. As

a consequence, villagers in some ways became more dependent on government support systems instead of wholeheartedly adopting the *Saemaul* spirit characteristics of self-help and self-reliance.

175. On the other hand, the rapid urbanization of the 1960s weakened the socioeconomic identity of rural communities. The rural population felt deprived of urban economic progress and was therefore reluctant to participate in the SU movement during its initial stages because they did not expect achievement of their goals in the later stages. Both rural and urban communities suffered from several factors that discouraged their active participation in the movement. First, the Confucian-oriented prejudices of social status and gender discrimination in the early 1970s often frustrated the participatory approach that was the hallmark of the SU movement, particularly in rural communities. Second, the rapid urbanization of the late 1960s weakened the age composition of the rural labor force in that it lost a significant amount of its younger members to rural-urban migration. Third, a cynical attitude toward the government-initiated SU movement prevailed among several groups, including the political opposition, groups strongly opposed to the Yusin regime, and urban intellectuals, despite the government's encouraging *Saemaul* education among the elite.

Traditional Legacies

176. Confucian traditions tended to be resilient, even in the early 1970s. Nepotism, victimization of others based on social status, gender discrimination, and priority being given to the humanities over engineering and the sciences often stifled active participation in the SU movement. This was in part true because the movement promulgated a more modern perspective toward life with its antinepotism, antidiscrimination stance, as well as the priority it gave to practical science.

177. Village elders, particularly those in single-lineage villages, did not welcome the SU movement, which was led by young *Saemaul* leaders who ignored traditions that required them to defer to those more senior than themselves. In conservative Confucian-oriented single-lineage villages, kin-group elders expected to remain the final decision makers. Under the SU movement, however, the village general meeting, which was led by the young *Saemaul* leaders, was the top decision-making body.

Thus, when the authority of the kin-group elders conflicted with the views of the village general meeting, villagers often became more passive in their participation in the SU movement.

178. In the early 1970s, family origin determined the social status of the people in the Republic of Korea. *Yangban* scholar-officials and *yangban literati* have traditionally been admired by the people, whose ancestors in the 18th and 19th centuries sometimes even fabricated their genealogies in order to affiliate with *yangban* families. Thus in many cases, family background strongly affected social relations in community life. In the SU movement, participation was weak in villages that victimized individual members because of the status of their families.

179. Gender discrimination under the traditional Confucian order limited women to domestic household work. They were not allowed to participate in social activities beyond household affairs. Women were to provide their labor not only for household duties, but also for farm work. Such traditional biases were challenged by the SU movement. During the movement's early stages, this legacy discouraged participation because it advocated active involvement by women in community activities.

Weakness in the Age Composition of the Rural Labor Force

180. Rural-urban migration by young members of village communities weakened the age composition of the rural labor force because it increased the average age of rural labor. This adversely affected participation in the SU movement. Unfortunately, young rural migrants working in industrial sites were often paid low wages, which in turn increased urban poverty, which likewise discouraged their participation in the urban SU movement.

181. Villages with an older labor force tended to support the tradition-oriented mentality of the older rural population. This to some degree worked at odds with the objectives of the *Saemaul* spirit values of diligence, self-help, and cooperation.

182. Meanwhile, rapid urbanization resulting from rural-urban migration exacerbated urban poverty and all of its attendant problems, including that of proliferation of urban slums. Beginning in the 1960s, the mountain hillsides of metropolitan Pusan and

Seoul were transformed into rural-migrant slums and shantytowns, their residents occupying land without payment. In August 1971, the government attempted to relocate these slum residents into Gwangju, a satellite town located in one of Seoul's southern suburbs. However, the slum residents refused to leave because their shantytowns were conveniently located at sites adjacent to their workplaces. This conflict ultimately gave rise to the Gwangju Riot of 1971, which hampered the urban *Saemaul* movement.

Antigovernment Political Criticism

183. In October 1972, the Yusin Constitution was established in the wake of a palace coup by the authoritarian Park Chung Hee administration. For their part, the country's liberal elites were divided into two camps: the anti-Yusin democratization activists and the pro-*Saemaul* movement advocates. The anti-Yusin "democratization movement" by dissident leaders from political, religious, labor, and student circles discouraged participation in the SU movement, condemning *Saemaul* education as mere political indoctrination in economic-oriented government policies. The urban SU movement in the industrial sites in particular began to be challenged by a clandestine labor movement encouraged by small number of progressive religious leaders and Marxist-oriented student activists.

184. Such social criticism of the SU movement, which evoked intellectual cynicism on the part of liberal academicians and journalists, made participation in the SU movement difficult for many people and prevented them from taking advantage of the training that it provided. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the training camps offered at the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders became quasi-compulsory for members of the social elite in both the public and private sectors. This aspect of *Saemaul* education often made the urban elite reluctant to participate in *Saemaul* education, despite its overall popularity among high-ranking government officials.

185. In the end, a small number of democratization activists influenced the majority of the nation's intellectuals, the latter coming to regard the SU movement with cynicism. Major daily newspapers refused to print *Saemaul* success stories because their editors judged them to be government propaganda. Such intellectual cynicism weakened nationwide participation in the SU movement by opinion-leader groups, particularly in the urban communities.

Factors Contributing to Community Participation in the *Saemaul Undong* Movement

186. Political and bureaucratic leadership in the government, ideological guidance, increasing the role of women in local communities, and availability of resources and financing all either facilitated or contributed to participation in the SU movement. As for political leadership, the rural roots of Park Chung Hee made him determined to promote the SU movement with all the authoritarian political influence he could muster. In this task, he was assisted by an uncorrupted government that efficiently implemented Park's vision. Further, the nation's educated masses tended to follow government leadership (C.Y. Kim 2011, D.K. Kim 2005). The ideological guidance of the *Saemaul* spirit awakened people from their chronic defeatism and tradition-bound Confucian-oriented ways of thinking. The changing role of women similarly enriched community life and made administration of the SU movement more efficient. Further, effective community investment via government-supported loans contributed to active participation in the SU movement. Community financing and resources, including self-support and loans from semipublic banks such as the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (Nong Hyop) and National Fishery Cooperative Federation (Su Hyop), increased the supply of financing to the SU movement to such an extent in the latter 1970s that they exceeded the total amount of the government subsidy provided from both the national and local budgets (Reed 2010).

187. Such a level of participation in the SU movement would have been impossible without the 1949 agrarian land reform. Former Prime Minister Goh Kun, who was then *Saemaul* director at the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Park Chung Hee administration, pointed out in 1970 the importance of the historical socioeconomic dimension of the country's

land reform experience. Under the 1949 Agrarian Land Reform Law, the government compensated landlords with state-certified notes and distributed the lands it expropriated from them to the former tenant tillers, who had to redeem the notes over the long term in in-kind payments.² It was in fact President Syngman Rhee, the anticommunist president of the nascent Republic of Korea, who proclaimed the Agrarian Land Reform Law in June 1949, though it had originally been planned and initiated by the US Army military government in the country in 1946. Thanks to agrarian land reform completed during the war (1950–1953) and the following years, most of the tillers in rural villages owned their rice paddies by virtue of this law, which prohibited non-tillers from owning agrarian land. Despite the financial sacrifices of the former landlords, who now held low-value, state-certified land notes, and despite illegal selling of land ownership in the informal market by poor tenant tillers, the reform has been evaluated in studies in the Republic of Korea as a key factor in the successful modernization in the country's rural community (I.Y. Kim 2006, Chang 2006, Lie 1998).

188. This chapter discusses the government's impact on community participation under the SU movement and the degree of economic development it achieved at the local level. In this regard, both availability of resources and financing and female participation played central roles.

Role of the Government

189. Since the SU movement was initiated by President Park Chung Hee, the government played a central role in encouraging local community

² At a private meeting in 2009, former Prime Minister Goh Kun mentioned the 1949 agrarian land reform initiated by President Syngman Rhee in relation to the success of the SU movement during the 1970s.

participation in the SU movement. This central role was catalytic in that it encouraged voluntary participation in the SU movement but outwardly remained marginal in its influence. For example, by pursuing an SU strategy of “helping those villages that help themselves,” the government was able to achieve a demonstration effect that stimulated competitive participation by local communities. Similarly, it encouraged government–village cooperation through local administrations that had little autonomy during the 1970s. Further, since the media was completely controlled by the government during this period, it was used as a channel for public education concerning the SU movement, which ultimately led to widespread active participation by local communities.

Government Campaign

190. By 1980, the Ministry of Home Affairs had compiled statistics on the achievements in the SU movement in 1971–1979 and assigned them to the following six categories:

- (i) basic production infrastructure,
- (ii) increases in household income,
- (iii) welfare and environment,
- (iv) spiritual enlightenment,
- (v) the industrial SU movement, and
- (vi) others, such as the school movement.

Government statistics on the achievement of all the SU projects by year and province reveal how the government was involved in the SU movement during the 1970s.

191. Although the government’s bureaucratic campaign tended to assign priority to quantitative goals at the expense of quality, it catalyzed competition in SU participation, and overall, the government strategy for supporting the SU movement did promote participation. Thatched-roof replacement, the emblematic project of the early SU movement, physically transformed the “old village” into the “new village,” which had a powerful stimulating effect on overall participation in the SU movement.

192. During the initial stage of the SU movement, the standardized *Saemaul* projects designed by the government were applied simultaneously to all of the nation’s rural communities. Yet rural development tended to vary among villages, even though to some

degree it retained an underlying homogeneity. The standardized *Saemaul* blueprint for rural community development was not always acceptable to individual villages in that each village had unique development processes. As a result, the government began to reevaluate the standard CDD blueprint under the SU movement and produced a series of models that corresponded to individual village patterns. The village general meeting then became the venue at which the members of each local community chose SU projects from this menu of CDD models available to them, the projects chosen being the most appropriate to their particular village.

Government–Village Cooperation

193. During the 1970s, the country’s centralized government structure placed rural communities at the bottom of the multilayered administrative bureaucracy. Government policies on rural affairs including rice production targets, rice price decisions, and taxes were established by top ministries in the national capital. They were then passed down through the government’s bureaucratic, pyramid-like administrative structure until they reached the villages through clerks at the town level. Under the SU movement, however, the government institutionalized government–village cooperation through technical guidance and financial consulting with local government officials. The multilayered *Saemaul* promotional councils at the five levels of the government administration coordinated implementation of the SU movement between the government and the local community. This institutionalized government–village cooperation tended to animate community participation in the SU movement.

194. Given that most *Saemaul* projects were implemented with government support in the form of both physical resources and funding, as well as with private financing from government-controlled cooperatives, rural communities were often frustrated in their efforts to implement the *Saemaul* spirit trait of self-help. Bureaucratic SU instructions seemed to contradict the idea that the government was helping villagers who helped themselves. In this regard, this type of government support tended to increase rural dependency on the government. Since the SU movement was to be implemented by the community members, government roles were limited. This tended to counteract the dependency of rural villages on the government referred to above. That

said, the government provided administrative guidance, material support, technology, project evaluation resources, and high-ranking officers who were assigned to each region.

195. Government guidance did not dictate that any special project be undertaken. Instead, government officials consulted the villagers on legal, technical, and educational issues. Support in the form of both financing and equipment provided to the SU movement included government financial subsidies, construction materials, and leased equipment. The government likewise provided technological guidance relating to agricultural production and construction. Similarly, the government analyzed SU movement project processes and evaluated the achievement of the individual villages as a means of providing feedback to each. The government also assigned high-ranking division directors from the Ministry of Home Affairs to supervise provincial SU movement processes and provided local government officers to counties, towns, and villages. Such collaborative advice and support of the local government through government–village cooperation encouraged communities to participate in the SU movement.

Publicity

196. The government used its control over the nation’s mass media for purposes of publicizing the achievements of the SU movement, a factor that also increased participation.

197. **Government organ.** During 1970s, both print and broadcast media were almost completely controlled by the central government. The only exceptions were a few daily newspapers that tended to lead public opinion owing to their large circulation. That said, the Ministry of Culture and Information—the government agency that controlled the media at the time—was powerful enough to influence even those newspapers, which rarely commented on the SU movement. In cases in which they did, they simply presented the SU movement as a political campaign of the unpopular Yusin regime that in some ways resembled Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward in [the People’s Republic of] China or Kim Il Sung’s Chollima Movement in the Democratic Republic of Korea to the north. Further, they rarely printed editorials relating to the movement or

featured detailed field reporting that illustrated its impact at the personal level. Only the *Seoul Shinmun*, the government organ, printed editorial or analytical articles about the SU movement and used field reporting to show its impact. Invariably presented in a positive light, such articles helped to encourage the movement. The government also published a weekly newspaper, the *Saemaul Shinmun*, which was the *Saemaul* newspaper. However, its impact on readers was minimal because most of the audience overlooked it as mere government policy propaganda.

198. Since the onset of the SU movement in 1970, the *Seoul Shinmun* has reported the achievements of more than 100 rural villages and urban communities via in-depth reporting of *Saemaul* projects. Despite the fact that those articles were somewhat politically colored, they constituted first-hand accounts of the SU movement. Moreover, during 1972–1973 this daily newspaper created a group of CDD specialists that included sociologists, economists, and agricultural scientists for the purpose of analyzing and evaluating the achievements of the SU movement and published their findings. Further, during 1972–1973 the *Seoul Shinmun* carried numerous opinion columns relating to the SU movement authored by scholars in the Republic of Korea and abroad. Finally, during the 1970s the *Seoul Shinmun* was distributed free of charge to every rural community, the costs of such distribution being met from the local government budget.

199. **Radio, television, and film.** Beginning in the early 1970s, ownership of black-and-white television sets began increasing, as these were produced domestically. That said, the television audience was smaller than the radio audience, and as a result television had less influence. The government-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) focused its SU publicity campaign on the Saemaul Broadcasting Center, which was established in 1972 for the purpose of reporting on large-scale SU projects. In 1973, the government influenced the coverage of the SU movement by other two broadcasting companies (the publicly owned MBC and the privately owned TBC) through the Broadcasting Coordination Commission.

200. Sixty-six public relations films relating to the SU movement were produced from 1971 to 1980.

The film *The Land of Korea (Palto gangsan, or Eight Provinces)*, produced in 1972 as a private production with government support, was one of the most successful media campaigns for the SU movement in terms of popularity. The protagonists, an old couple portrayed by the country's most popular actor and actress, visit their married daughters in eight different provinces where better village lives have been made possible through the SU movement.

Influence of Leadership

New Leadership

201. Given that the SU movement was a CDD program, democratic community leadership was critical to participation in the movement. The SU movement's young leadership played a decisive role in increasing participation in the movement. Typically, the *Saemaul* leader's role was distinguished from that of the village chief, the administrative head of the bottom unit in the local government pyramid. While the village chiefs served as messengers passing instructions from higher local government agencies on to villagers, the *Saemaul* leaders played a more active role, proposing SU projects through discussion with community members and using their influence with local government officials regarding decisions relating to SU projects. However, not all *Saemaul* leaders were capable of quality value judgments and practices. Moreover, the views of the new leadership often conflicted with those of conventional local community opinion leaders.

202. The above notwithstanding, *Saemaul* leaders took their new roles seriously and became core members of the SU movement who initiated CDD programs and projects. In this regard, they planned SU projects for the community and executed them following approval through the village general meeting. They likewise evaluated projects and reported their achievements at the village meetings. They also gathered new information regarding agricultural technology and marketing of products in order to increase household incomes. Finally, they taught and trained villagers in agricultural and construction technologies, coordinated with the public-sector elite at both the town- and county-level *Saemaul* promotional councils, and represented the opinions of the villagers they represented.

Leadership Training

203. *Saemaul* leadership training encouraged SU participation by promoting communication among *Saemaul* leaders from various parts of the country. This training provided an opportunity for *Saemaul* leaders to share their experiences at both the regional and national levels with both the rural and urban elite. Moreover, the *Saemaul* leaders were praised by President Park Chung Hee, who named them "ushers of the nation's modernization," "vanguards of the Yusin Constitution," and "guides of the patriotic movement." SU participation was similarly promoted by means of the encouragement provided during the training programs at the Training Institute for *Saemaul* Leaders.

204. Throughout the 1970s, *Saemaul* education spread to about 80 training institutes at government organizations, schools, and industrial sites. At the Training Institute for *Saemaul* Leaders, which was inaugurated in 1972, trainees from all social backgrounds participated. In October 1980, the number of trainees reached 811,000, this number including 267,000 *Saemaul* leaders, 274,000 members of the urban elite, and 270,000 civil servants. At the training institute, *Saemaul* leaders from rural communities not only impressed the nation's urban elite from the public and private sectors with their practice of *Saemaul* spirit, but also increased their own confidence in the SU movement.

205. Given only the elementary or middle-school educational background of most *Saemaul* leaders in rural communities, *Saemaul* education programs for them focused on practicing the *Saemaul* spirit (diligence, self-help, and cooperation) rather than on CDD theory. *Saemaul* leaders played active roles at local *Saemaul* training institutes in that they morally rearmed themselves with the *Saemaul* spirit, which facilitated their training of community leaders in their roles in the SU movement.

Leadership Problems

206. Throughout their colonial and war-torn modern history, rural villagers had no opportunity to practice democratic leadership. During colonial days, community leaders were not democratically elected, but instead were nominated by colonial authorities. This colonial legacy of local government abuse of power continued even after liberation and

independence. Under the SU movement, however, *Saemaul* leaders rarely abused their power. If they did, they were replaced through a vote at the village general meeting, as they served at its pleasure

207. Given that most community opinion leaders were older, educated, and drawn from professional backgrounds, problems regarding cooperation between *Saemaul* leaders and opinion leaders occurred. Such conflicts were relieved through *Saemaul* education and discussion in the village general meeting.

Gender

208. The SU movement created new roles for women, providing opportunities for their involvement in community labor beyond housework. Women's participation increased in community productive activities including SU projects (such as the rice-saving campaign), fund-raising, wage earning, and sideline businesses. Women's participation in income-generating projects contributed to fund-raising for community development, which impressed male members including their husbands.

Women's Role in Communities

209. Under the SU movement, people began to rethink gender discrimination. For example, during the 1970s, the preference for sons over daughters remained a dominant theme in family planning practices. However, as the movement enlightened the social consciousness of the people, gender tolerance gradually arose within society, which increased women's prestige within both the family and the community.

210. This was particularly true of the female *Saemaul* leaders' role in the rural community. As the level of gender tolerance in the society increased, female political participation in village general meetings grew, and women played an increasingly important role in decision making as it related to *Saemaul* projects. Meanwhile, the number of women workers in the labor-intensive industries operating in urban areas grew rapidly during the 1970s, which further served to raise their level of participation in the urban SU movement. In tandem with the society's growing tolerance of women's expanding

sociopolitical role, the SU movement ultimately helped change the long-standing tradition of preferring sons to daughters, although this took place over subsequent decades.

Household Productivity

211. The productivity movement spearheaded by women greatly contributed to improving productivity at the household level in both rural and urban communities. In rural villages, most income-generating efforts within the household, such as wage-earning side jobs and promoting frugality campaigns, depended on the efforts of women. In the urban communities as well, women increased household productivity by spearheading frugality movements.

212. The frugality campaign—which was driven by the SU movement—emphasized recording of daily expenditures, the purpose of this being week-by-week and month-by-month analyses of household expenditure patterns for the purpose of reducing household costs and thereby increasing household disposable income. The positive impact of this budgeting on household income was so great that many women chose to participate in the SU movement for the purpose of accessing these benefits.

Ideological Guidance

213. The role of ideological guidance in the SU movement was one of the most important factors in increasing community participation in the movement. Ideological guidance empowered community members by transforming their attitude from passive obedience to one of assertiveness that was channeled into community development. The *cando* spirit of the SU movement prevailed throughout the nation during the 1970s as the achievements of the people in implementing SU projects confirmed their ability to change their own destiny. Ideological guidance was emphasized throughout *Saemaul* education, including the training camp courses conducted at the Training Institute for *Saemaul* Leaders.

214. Meanwhile, political dissidents who were ideologically against President Park Chung Hee criticized the SU movement as a political campaign,

the goal of which was simply to legitimize the Yusin regime. These dissenting voices included opposition leaders, radical student movement leaders, liberal religious leaders, and progressive cultural leaders. In urban communities in particular, many white-collar workers who were burdened with heavy workloads turned away from participation in the SU movement. Nevertheless, training camps helped antigovernment dissidents to understand the movement. Compulsory *Saemaul* Day events in many workplaces and offices were thus replaced by *Saemaul* education in practical meetings that were unrelated to the SU movement. More and more, political dissidents recognized the democratic operation of the village general meeting as a process by which local communities could prepare for full democracy.

Reconciliation with Tradition

215. The *Saemaul* spirit of diligence, self-help, and cooperation as promulgated by President Park was essentially an ideology of modernization of rural communities driven by revitalization of traditional community consciousness and values. Thus the foundation of the approach the government used to drive the *Saemaul* movement and the modernization that accompanied it was revitalization—rather than rejection—of traditional values and folkways, albeit with appropriate adaptations to make both consistent with the community-driven development model. This was in fact the reason that the SU movement used the village as its fundamental unit of social organization. Doing so allowed long-standing village-based traditions of mutual aid and collective social consciousness that are strongly rooted in the Confucian order to propel the SU movement.

Adaptability of Modernization

216. The SU movement focused villagers' attention on achieving a "better life" in the rural communities they inhabited. However, the SU notion of a better life transcended micro-level development of rural villages by encouraging modernization through

- (i) fulfilling the income-earning potential of each individual member of the community,
- (ii) improving the living conditions in the community overall,

- (iii) exploiting the community's economic resources, and
- (iv) encouraging creativity in adapting to changing circumstances.

217. The can-do aspect of the *Saemaul* spirit encouraged community members to develop their potential to challenge nature through education. The improved living environment provided by SU movement initiatives made people confident enough to explore new economic resources and means of increasing productivity. Thus the ideological guidance of the *Saemaul* spirit and the can-do attitude it encouraged transformed communities from traditional, backward, subsistence, static societies into a modern, advanced, commercial, dynamic people.

Availability of Resources and Financing

218. Effective community investment contributed to active participation in the SU movement. *Saemaul* projects were increasingly funded from community resources and financing instead of from the government budget. Community SU investment, including self-support and loans from the government-controlled semipublic banks such as the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the National Fishery Cooperative Federation, grew to an extent in the late 1970s that these sources surpassed government support to SU projects in both the national and local budgets.

219. The total amount of investment under the SU movement during 1971–1979 amounted to W2,752.1 billion, of which W772.5 billion (28%) was provided by the government and W1,979.6 billion (72%) by local communities (Table 6). Major investment by the government and the communities in the 1970s targeted SU projects in rural villages, such as expansion of village road networks; construction of farm roads, small bridges, and community facilities; alignment of farmlands; upgrading of residential housing; electrification; establishment of *Saemaul* factories; and forestation. Consequently, the achievements of the SU movement increased the liabilities of the rural communities. Whereas funding in the rural communities supported the SU, growing rural household debt pressured community members.

Table 6: Saemaul Undong Investment by Year and Funding Source
(billions of won)

Year	Government Support			Community Financing			
	Total	Subtotal	National Budget	Local Budget	Subtotal	Loan (NA/FCF)	Self-Support
Total	2,752.1	772.5	395.4	377.1	1,979.6	627.2	1,352.4
1971	12.2	4.1	2.7	1.4	8.1	–	8.1
1972	31.3	3.3	2.0	1.3	28.0	–	28.0
1973	98.4	21.5	12.5	9.0	76.9	–	76.9
1974	132.8	29.4	12.1	17.3	103.4	1.4	102.0
1975	295.9	124.5	66.6	57.9	171.4	40.8	130.6
1976	322.6	84.0	48.4	39.6	234.6	77.1	157.5
1977	466.5	132.2	59.9	72.3	334.3	113.8	220.5
1978	634.2	113.7	65.4	77.3	491.5	195.7	295.8
1979	758.2	226.8	125.8	101.0	531.4	198.4	333.0

NA/FCF = National Agricultural/Fishery Cooperative Federation

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. *Ten-Year History of Saemaul Undong Movement*. Seoul.

Government Resources

220. Building on the initial government subsidy to local communities of cement and iron rods, the SU movement successfully catalyzed active participation by rural communities. In 1971–1979, government support of W772.5 billion leveraged W1,979.6 billion in community financing. During the same period, government support included W395.4 billion from the national budget, W377.1 billion from local budgets, and W627.2 billion in loans. The annual investment for the SU movement increased as the movement progressed. For example, government investment in the movement increased from W28.9 billion during Stage I to W237.9 in Stage II and then to W472.7 billion in Stage III. During stages II and III, local government subsidies grew to such an extent that they exceeded investment in the SU movement from the national budget.

Community Financing

221. Thanks to government support, self-help investment by the rural communities of W141.9 billion exceeded government financing of the SU movement of W113.0 billion during Stage I, this rising to W509.4 billion and finally to W1.357 trillion in Stage III. W1.98 trillion of community financing in 1971–1979 nearly tripled the W772.5 billion in support provided by the government. Finally, through government support for SU movement financing, rural communities funded their *Saemaul* projects with long-term, low-interest loans from government-sponsored cooperatives that included the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the National Fishery Cooperative Federation. In addition, the *Saemaul* Bank contributed not only to savings by wage-earning villagers who worked in side employment but also to financing of SU projects.

Conclusions and Recommendations

222. This report summarizes the major outcomes of the *Saemaul Undong*, the New Village Movement (or “SU movement” as it is often referred to), which was a decade-long, community-driven development (CDD) initiative pursued during the 1970s in the Republic of Korea. Ultimately, this CDD initiative produced both tangible and intangible benefits that made long-term growth in both per capita income and well-being possible for the people. One of the most important benefits the initiative produced was a sweeping change in the mind set of the people from chronic defeatism to one of “can-do” enthusiasm that drove rapid overall development within the society. Without this change in mind set, the SU movement’s long-term impact on individual and community well-being would not have been possible.

223. Ultimately, the change in mind set referred to above made possible the tangible outcomes of the SU movement that in turn improved individual and community well-being. These outcomes may be summarized as follows:

- (i) poverty reduction through rapid increases in household income;
- (ii) access to modern infrastructure and services delivered in the form of mechanized farming, electrification, improvement of residential housing, and health services, the latter including farming-season day-care nurseries;
- (iii) community empowerment through amassing of social capital and concomitant growth in civil society;
- (iv) community revitalization through younger leadership and promulgation of status-free village social life; and
- (v) elevation of the role of women through increased female social participation and advancement of women in the role of household management (C.Y. Kim 2011, Ha 2010, Reed 2010, You 1980).

224. The participatory aspects of the SU movement emerged in both the political and socioeconomic

dimensions. In part, the degree of participation achieved by the SU movement was at times hampered by (i) cultural legacies that traditionally assigned elevated social roles to males and senior persons, (ii) rapid rural–urban migration that diminished the number of youthful rural workers and thus raised the average age of the rural labor force, and (iii) antigovernment political criticism that superficially portrayed the SU movement in a negative light.

225. Balancing the above disadvantages to full social participation in the SU movement were

- (i) strengthened community participation in the movement brought about by institutionalized coordination between the government and civilian sectors through the *Saemaul* promotion councils,
- (ii) encouragement of female participants in all aspects of the SU movement, including its leadership, and
- (iii) *Saemaul* education that dispelled negative superficial stereotypes of the movement and encouraged all dimensions of self-improvement through voluntary participation in it.

226. The study on which this report is based analyzed the factors that contributed to community participation in the SU movement in a number of dimensions as follows: (i) institutional arrangements, (ii) the influence of leadership, (iii) gender-based considerations, (iv) ideological guidance, and (v) financing. With regard to institutional arrangements, the government played a critical role in promoting participation in the movement through a series of systematic campaigns, a stance toward the movement that placed the government in the role of catalyst, institutionalized government–village cooperation, and publicity campaigns in large measure implemented with the assistance of a cooperative media. The impact of leadership on participation in the movement primarily occurred in the following dimensions: youthfulness of the movement’s leadership, the content and style of *Saemaul* training

programs, and the pathways through which leadership problems were resolved. Women actively participated in the SU movement through their roles in the community and the household alike. Ideological guidance disseminated through *Saemaul* education encouraged universal participation by reconciling tradition and modernization. Finally, availability of tangible resources and financing for the SU movement made widespread participation possible.

227. The SU movement pursued by the Republic of Korea during the 1970s cannot be considered a universal CDD model for developing countries, if by “model” we mean a package that can be transplanted more or less intact to a different context with the expectation of similar results. Most developing countries in the 2010s face drastically different rural, national, and international environments as compared with the Republic of Korea in the 1970s. Nonetheless, with appropriate adaptation, some of the principles of the SU movement may to some degree be applied in modern-day Asian developing countries. These principles occur in the following dimensions: socio-economic foundations, government roles, leadership roles, and operational principles.

Socioeconomic Foundations

228. Promulgation of the *Saemaul* spirit—and in particular, its three components of diligence, self-help, and cooperation—through training camp education is strongly recommended, as in the case of the Republic of Korea it provided the initial rationale for the community itself being responsible for development, albeit with some government support. Ultimately, the government adopted a “heaven helps those who help themselves” stance toward development, which made the local community ultimately responsible for providing the bulk of both the material and the financial support for the development projects it alone initiated.

229. Moreover, the *Saemaul* spirit provided ideological guidance for the SU movement in that it awakened within a people previously focused on chronic defeatism an infectious “can-do” mind set that transformed passive obedience into self-assured community development based on volunteerism. The *Saemaul* spirit was primarily inculcated through *Saemaul* training camp sessions at the Training Institute for *Saemaul* Leaders. The fact

that the *Saemaul* spirit spread so rapidly through the population of the Republic of Korea is testimony to the fact that it was based on voluntary participation of a type that quickly amassed *sinbaram* social capital (social capital based on volunteerism) rather than social capital accumulated through government compulsion.

230. To elevate the role of women and thus to make the most efficient use of available labor, male–female paired leadership at the village level is desirable, even in traditionally male-dominated Asian rural communities. The election of male and female *Saemaul* leaders at village general meetings provided public confirmation of the transformed role of women as well as their full participation in all aspects of CDD initiatives. This likewise encouraged the participation of men formerly reluctant to take part in community-level CDD initiatives. The efficacy of the male–female paired *Saemaul* leadership in persuading the residents of rural villages to participate in the movement was in some cases further increased due to the fact this pair was a husband-and-wife team. This effectively placed the husband in the position of having to defend his wife against tradition-bounded biases, such as elevated roles for males, that hampered full participation in village-level development initiatives.

231. Microfinance institutions such as the *Saemaul* Bank (Village Bank), are likely to be helpful to community-based development initiatives in low-income communities in the developing countries of the Asia and Pacific region. In the Republic of Korea, this was mainly true because the *Saemaul* Bank replaced the notorious private banking system that charged such exorbitant rates of interest on loans to low-income villagers that it ultimately impoverished them further. During the 1970s, the *Saemaul* Bank raised funds for community projects, increased the pool of savings on which the community could draw, and managed community assets, these beneficial aspects being in proportion to the rapid increases in rural household income achieved by the SU movement. In sum, the *Saemaul* Bank not only facilitated saving by villagers, many of whom earned wages in side employment, but also financed SU movement projects implemented at the community level.

232. One lesson of the SU movement that is often overlooked is that preservation of cultural heritage is a factor that should be consciously considered when

formulating and implementing CDD programs, as in some cases there may be a tradeoff between preservation of cultural heritage and the pace of CDD. In the case of the Republic of Korea, the SU movement encouraged people to modernize their homes and communities, and as a result, a significant portion of the country's traditional cultural heritage was lost. For example, shamanistic village poles displaying carved images, village-god shrines, village folk ceremonies, and other folkways were decimated to allow a transformed village appearance. While this may have been an essential element in transforming the mind set of society at large from defeatism to self-assertion, viewed in retrospect, this was an important trade-off that in large measure went unexamined. The fact that government policy makers have more recently attempted to balance upgrading of basic infrastructure with cultural heritage preservation is testimony to the long-term importance of this trade-off.

Role of the Government

233. A top-down command-and-control stance toward government involvement in CDD projects should be avoided. This type of approach sometimes distorted the decision-making process in the SU movement. This mainly occurred as a result of multilayered government support systems and central government policies that were passed down through five echelons of local government administration, ultimately reaching the local community in the form of ultimatums delivered to the village by town clerks. In contrast, the SU movement demonstrated that the best results occur when the government helps those communities that help themselves. Top-down command-and-control administration often discouraged participation by local community members, who were the bottom rung of an imposing administrative ladder. Such a stance by the government likewise stifled creative ideas that in the end formed one of the greatest strengths of the SU movement. Similarly, a command-and-control stance toward development initiatives incentivizes dependence on government support. Perhaps the most negative aspect of a command-and-control stance toward CDD projects in the country's experience was that it seriously contradicted the *Saemaul* spirit notion of self-help. Ultimately, the SU movement created an incentive system to which local communities responded, primarily because it was

based on practical results that were publicly confirmed at village general meetings. This encouraged further self-assertion by members of the local community in formulating and implementing development initiatives, thus facilitating a cooperative relationship between the government and the local community.

234. Prioritizing quantity over quality in monitoring and evaluating the results of CDD initiatives must be avoided, mainly because community-driven development initiatives have long-range and far-reaching benefits that are rarely captured by quantitative indicators that focus on short-term achievements that are evaluated at the end of a single project cycle. For example, the thatched-roof replacement project under which roofs made of straw were replaced with tin, tile, or slate coverings had a powerful demonstration effect in that this change represented modernization, efficacy, self-help, and efficiency to local residents. These attributes substantially incentivized villagers to formulate, finance, and implement further community-level development projects. Until these long-term, far-reaching benefits of a single development initiative were fully understood, quantitative achievements were prioritized over quality of outputs, which ultimately meant that technology was lacking and scientific development was neglected.

Leadership Roles

235. Strong national political leadership with a commitment to sustainable CDD is desirable if the best outputs are to be achieved from development initiatives. Not every country will have a Park Chung Hee leading its CDD programs. That said, many well-educated political leaders with a long-term vision of socioeconomic development can be found at both the national and local levels in modern-day developing countries. In the Republic of Korea, President Park headed the SU movement with the help of dedicated technocrats, and as a result, the nation's educated masses responded with wide participation in the SU movement.

236. CDD leaders must be screened and trained to ensure that abuse of administrative power is avoided. The requisite qualifications of *Saemaul* leaders included passion, creativity, devotion, diligence, health, and secondary education. Further, *Saemaul* leaders were not paid for their services, but

instead performed them as volunteers. While a few of them were on occasion honored and encouraged by President Park himself, on some occasions this led to abuse, in that some of these individuals sought economic favors from higher-echelon government agencies.

Operational Principles

237. Standardized CDD blueprints should be avoided. One of the lessons of the SU movement was

that stereotypical development prescriptions resulting from fixed-scope thinking had little applicability in most local community contexts. Ultimately, the initial SU movement blueprint for stereotypical backward rural communities soon became outdated—and therefore inapplicable—due to rapid advancements in the level of socioeconomic development in SU-project villages. The standardized *Saemaul* CDD blueprint was therefore upgraded and updated to include a series of categorized models applicable to the various village types observed in a context of rapid socioeconomic development.

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The Saemaul Undong Movement in the Republic of Korea Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven Development

The Saemaul Undong movement was a community-driven development program of the Republic of Korea in the 1970s. The movement contributed to improved community well-being in rural communities through agricultural production, household income, village life, communal empowerment and regeneration, and women's participation. This report examines the strengths and weaknesses of the movement along with contributing factors, including institutional arrangements, leadership influence, gender consideration, ideological guidance, and financing. It also reviews existing studies and government data on the movement, and presents excerpts from interviews with key persons engaged in the movement and useful lessons for implementing community-driven development initiatives in developing countries.

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